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USSR Report

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No. 1, January 1984

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USSR REPORT

USA: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, IDEOLOGY

No. 1, January 1984

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ZAGLADIN CRITICIZES U.S. CONFRONTATION POLICY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 84 (signed to press 21 Dec 83) pp 6-9

[Article by V. V. Zagladin: "The World and America: Entering the Year 1984"; passages rendered in all capital letters are printed in boldface in source]

[Text] The Soviet Union and other peace-loving countries and forces have been warning for some time that the world is nearing a dangerous crossroads. Either it will turn towards consolidating the security of peoples or it will become a path leading to nuclear catastrophe. And so 1984 is upon us. Recalling the recent course of events, one involuntarily asks oneself the disturbing question: "Have we not already passed this crossroads? Has the world not already begun rolling down the hill leading to the abyss of nuclear war?"

There are numerous well-known reasons for drawing this conclusion. Indeed, a number of events of the past year--the bloody developments in Lebanon, the U.S. aggression against Grenada, the beginning of the deployment of American missiles on European soil--lead one to think that the fateful crossroads is indeed already behind us.

FIRST, what is now clearly involved is the fact that the United States is renouncing its stake in the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, contrary to common sense, and, what is more, contrary to the obligations it took upon itself by signing Soviet-American documents in the 1970's. Washington is now rigidly oriented to an ever more intensive confrontation with the world of socialism.

SECOND, this confrontation is more and more obviously being transferred to military channels. The arms race is really gaining unprecedented scale and intensity. It is hardly necessary to prove that this already represents a huge threat in itself.

THIRD, the way in which the American side conducted negotiations on medium-range nuclear missiles testifies to the virtual refusal of Washington to consider negotiations--and this is, in fact, the only realistic method of conducting international affairs in our nuclear age--to be an instrument for resolving existing problems. From now on, negotiations will be used by the United States as a screen for its militaristic and hegemonistic plans.

FOURTH, the United States is more and more persistently pushing its allies, primarily the countries of Western Europe, but also Japan, into the same course of confrontation with socialism. For Europe, which quite recently (in 1975) unanimously and triumphantly proclaimed its orientation towards the security and cooperation of countries, irrespective of their social systems, submitting to Washington's diktat would mean nothing less than virtually renouncing this orientation and regressing to the difficult times before Helsinki.

FIFTH, from the political point of view, present U.S. policy in actual fact encourages the most conservative forces--forces thirsting for political revenge. It is no accident that those striving to undermine the foundations of social progress and to inflict a cruel blow on the vital interests of the working people are now literally bursting into the political arena.

Finally, SIXTH, the present course of the American administration is fraught with serious threats to the economic development of the United States and also of other countries which are drawn into its military-political orbit. Even Washington now realizes more and more clearly that many difficult U.S. economic problems which are not being solved are the fruit of the arms race and the result of insanely amassing means of mass destruction. In the long run, the negative economic consequences of the arms race (primarily for the working people) will undoubtedly become still more obvious.

Therefore, signs of a dangerous turning point really do exist. What does the future hold? Or, speaking poetically, what does the coming day have in store for us? One involuntarily turns to the past and to history in search of answers to these questions.

The present turn of events in favor of confrontation, a policy being implemented by Washington, is by no means the first of its kind in the history of postwar international relations. In actual fact, Washington made a similar turnabout at the end of the 1940's--moving from cooperation with the Soviet Union in the years of World War II to confrontation, which at that time was given the appellation of "cold war."

Then, as today, attempts to resolve the historical conflict between two world systems and two opposed ideologies with the aid of force lay at the basis of the aggressive change in Washington's policy.

Then, as now, slogans were advanced which made it seem that there were things more important than peace (precisely this phrase was contained in the well-known message from President Truman in March 1947 which became a prominent landmark in the history of the "cold war").

It was also said then that the whole world is a "sphere of vital interest" of the United States, and claims were made about American "world leadership."

Then, as today, nuclear weapons were the main means of blackmail with respect to the socialist countries.

Then, as today, the United States committed one aggressive act after another against people in various parts of the world....

But how did all this end? It ended with the need to renounce the "cold war" and to bridle the policy of trying to "put an end to socialism" through the use of force. Why?

Various factors brought about this change in U.S. policy which was positive for all peoples. But of course the main thing was the change in the correlation of forces in the world arena. Having liquidated the U.S. nuclear monopoly, socialism and the Soviet Union were able to wreck Washington's nuclear blackmail. Against its will, it had to start thinking....

President R. Nixon concluded as early as the beginning of 1969 that America's superiority had become a thing of the past and that, under the new conditions, there was no alternative to negotiations and to normal relations with the Soviet Union. All of this found expression in subsequent Soviet-American covenants and agreements, documents which lay the foundation for normal neighborly relations between the two great countries.

A well-known aphorism says that history repeats itself. But if it is a tragedy the first time, then the tragedy becomes a farce the second time. There is no doubt that the measures taken by the Reagan Administration today can also have tragic consequences. Nevertheless, in many ways they seem a farce. A farce played on a completely cinematographical level. What we see on the screen far from always reflects the realities of life. In exactly the same way, current Washington policy is in no way constructed on a realistic consideration of the world situation and the world balance of power.

Indeed, the relapse to Truman-like fits of hysteria is taking place in a situation that is totally different from that of the 1940's. The world has changed. It has changed in a way that is better for the public and worse for its enemies.

First and foremost, socialism has grown, has gained strength and has become firmly established. Now it is no longer a question of an American nuclear monopoly, but of military-strategic parity between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. As Yu. V. Andropov says, the power of socialism today is such that we "would advise no one to organize a test of strength."

Of course, the socialist world does have its own problems and difficulties. We know that Washington is placing a great deal of hope on this. There they dream of using the arms race to wear socialism down and plunge it into a state of crisis. There is no doubt that the new efforts in the sphere of defense which socialism is now obliged to make do not make it easier to fulfill the peaceful and constructive tasks facing it. Nevertheless, it is unrealistic to expect socialism to be "worn down" in some way. Present-day socialism is a viable and dynamically developing organism. The problems it encounters are not ones of decay and decline, but rather of ascent--problems whose resolution will increase the might and potential of our society.

But, of course, changes have not only taken place in the socialist world. A huge and growing positive role is played in the world arena (sufficient proof of this can be found in the proceedings of recent UN General Assembly sessions) by countries which were still colonial and dependent appendages of imperialism in the 1940's. And can such a powerful social movement as the struggle of the masses against the military threat, a struggle that has reached an unprecedented scale, really be discounted? This movement has become an independent and important factor of world development, a factor which any pretender to world hegemony and to the role of repressor of progress is compelled to take into account--and will be compelled to do so more and more.

Finally, the capitalist world looks different today than it did in the 1940's. Of course, the United States is still the biggest imperialist power, but its relative power (in comparison to the 1940's) has undoubtedly diminished and continues to do so. Western Europe and Japan have become very impressive political and economic quantities. And, by the way, they are far from willing to yield to Washington's pressure in everything, despite the latter's bulldozer-like grip. Of course, the United States is still far from being a "colossus with feet of clay," but it is also no longer Gulliver among the Lilliputians.

By the way, the changes that have taken place in the world over past decades have also had a very tangible effect on the way in which the world community today perceives the actions of the U.S. administration in the world arena. Although these actions do give rise to a wave of chauvinism in certain strata of American society, they are met with repugnance and distrust by the rest of the world. People at different ends of the earth are asking themselves: Can we do business with a country whose policies are unpredictable and which takes no account of anyone or anything?

The "cold war" policy was a failure in the 1940's. It had to be renounced. The so-called naked eye can see that today's attempts to revive the "cold war" are being undertaken in conditions which are far less favorable to their organizers. What on earth are they counting on? Do they really not realize that hegemonist and adventurist plans of any kind have even less chance of success today than in the first postwar years?

Many people in the world today are also asking themselves another question: Where is the United States heading now--this country with such tremendous possibilities and such a significant share of responsibility for the state of events in the world? This question arises more and more often now, at the beginning of 1984, the year of the presidential elections. As yet, however, there is no clear answer.

At the same time, a conditional answer can be given. One would like to say this: If realism and a realistic appraisal of the actual situation in the world arena were to gain the upper hand in the United States over the narcotic of "American power," and if a realization of real U.S. interests were to gain the upper hand over a policy founded on illusory interests, then confrontation would be rejected and a new turn would take place in U.S. policy--a turn toward coexistence and peaceful cooperation. This turn is vitally necessary--necessary for everyone, including the United States itself.

We said: real U.S. interests. These real interests are a reality; they do exist. But now they are being suppressed, as if driven somewhere deep down. What is it all about?

The real interests of America and the Americans consist primarily in a secure life. But the present policy, which is founded on fiction rather than on fact, is leading toward a situation in which this security is being undermined. The United States has deployed its missiles in Europe. Has this strengthened anyone's security, including U.S. security? Not at all! On the contrary, today the security of America has become more vulnerable and fragile than ever before, as a result of the countermeasures the Soviet Union and its allies have been compelled to take. If the Geneva negotiations had not been broken off, and if an agreement had been concluded there to reduce intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe, the security of Europe would have been strengthened and, at the same time, the risk of tragic conflict for America itself would have been reduced.

Living in a state of well-being is in the real interest of America and its people. But is the present Washington administration's policy increasing the well-being of the Americans? Of course not! On the contrary, both the arms race, which is gaining cosmic proportions in the literal and figurative senses, and the government's social policy are causing the conditions of life in America to deteriorate and are making the outlook for tomorrow ever more alarming.

We will not go on with this list. One thing is clear: The real interests of America, upon which no one, including the Soviet Union, intends to encroach, have nothing to do with the course being pursued by Washington today. Do the people in the United States know this? By all appearances, there are many people there who adhere to a realistic position, and the number is growing.

Can these people steer their national ship into the channel of realism, the channel of peace? At the moment it is difficult to say. But we will say again that, firstly, it is necessary and, secondly, it is completely possible, as the experience of the postwar years shows. Here, in this realistic channel, America will always enjoy the understanding and support of the Soviet Union and its allies. "The Soviet Union," Yu. V. Andropov's statement of 24 November 1983 said, "will continue to adhere to its principled efforts to curb the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, and to reduce and eventually eliminate the danger of nuclear war."

Now, on the threshold of 1984, mankind is watching the development of events on the other side of the ocean with disappointment and alarm but also with hope. It is not difficult to understand this disappointment and alarm. As far as hope is concerned, it is engendered by faith in common sense and realism. We would like to believe that these qualities will ultimately cause America to return to the path of peace and coexistence, and to the path of peaceful and equal cooperation with all of the peoples of the world.

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REAGAN ANTI-UNION POLICIES LEADING TO 'RADICALIZATION OF MASSES'

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 84 (signed to press 21 Dec 83) pp 22-31

[Article by M. I. Lapitskiy: "The Labor Movement in Election Year"]

[Text] Labor organizations in the United States are growing perceptibly more active as the 1984 elections draw nearer. The organized labor movement is mapping out its positions, strategy and potential capabilities. Emerging from a lengthy period of retreat, the labor unions are beginning to take the offensive.

During the first years of this decade American labor unions experienced unprecedented attacks by capital on the vital interests and rights of the workers. The Reagan Administration led a purposeful offensive against the working public's standard of living and social gains. More than 10 million officially registered unemployed individuals, inflation, rising prices and continuous cuts in social programs--these are some of the results of the current administration's policy. The heavy burden of the current socioeconomic crisis is being compounded by Washington's escalation of the arms race. Unparalleled military spending is devouring huge sums and reducing the already meager allocations for social needs.

It is not surprising that relations between the administration and the labor unions have been exacerbated severely. In May 1982 the NEW YORK TIMES reported: "President Reagan's relations with labor unions, or with the majority of labor leaders in any case, are worse now, judging by all indications, than they have ever been in the past 50 years under any previous president--Republican or Democratic."¹

It is indicative, however, that although the AFL-CIO leadership has criticized the administration's socioeconomic program, it has not advised the workers to take overt action against it. Furthermore, it has counseled the curtailment of strikes and demonstrations by the unemployed, thereby aiding the administration to some degree: The administration has been able to deprive striking workers of their hard-won right to social assistance, has reduced the duration of unemployment compensation payments and has lowered the maximum income making the unemployed eligible for assistance.

Employers have taken advantage of unemployment and mass layoffs to indulge in further infringements of workers' rights. A Bureau of National Affairs study of 33 labor agreements negotiated in 1982 indicated that unions had to make serious concessions to big business in such vitally important areas as wages and working conditions.² The same thing occurred the next year. In the beginning of 1983, for example, seven giant American steel concerns forced the United Steelworkers of America to accept an ultimatum--to agree to a substantial cut in wages for the first time in 40 years. Under the threat of mass layoffs, concessions were also made by the labor unions representing automobile workers, miners, printers and workers in the food industry and several other industries.

The first sign of a joint frontal attack by the government and big business was the destruction of the air traffic controllers' union (by the irony of fate, this was one of the few segments of the organized labor movement that supported Reagan during the 1980 campaign). This was followed by the cancellation or relaxation of certain labor safety standards which many had considered to be immutable. According to AFL-CIO statistics, more than three-fourths of the American firms in the processing industry, employing 13 million workers, were exempted from government safety inspections.³ Penalties for violations of safety standards were reduced or repealed, and this decision was made without consulting the Congress.

By the time of the last election, there were around 1,000 firms of specialists and consultants advising employers how to keep unions from penetrating their enterprises, how to get rid of existing labor organizations and how to neutralize these organizations during the negotiation of labor contracts. This profitable field has been taken over by so-called consulting firms and some conventional law firms (including many extremely well-known ones) which now deal exclusively in advice to big business on its struggle against unions.

These firms have become much more active under the current President. The National Labor Relations Board, established in the 1930's as an agency which was supposed to protect the workers' right to participate freely in the labor movement, has declared, according to the NEW REPUBLIC, "a crusade against the unions." Van de Water, a zealous opponent of the unions who once bragged that he had never lost a case against the unions, was appointed chairman of the board by Reagan. He occupied this position for a year, although the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources described his behavior as "flagrant" and refused to approve his appointment.

Now the chairman of the National Labor Relations Board is D. Dotson, who is also famous for taking the side of big business. The workers' struggle for their rights, in his opinion, merely "undermines the market" and has resulted in "the crisis of once flourishing industries." The chairman has a perfect match in his chief assistant, H. Reilly, who worked for 8 years for a so-called labor protection legal fund before his appointment to the board. President Reagan admitted that the fund's main function was "anti-union activity." It is not surprising that not one worker requested the fund to protect his rights in a conflict with his employer during the entire 8 years Reilly worked there, as he himself admitted.

In August 1982 the WALL STREET JOURNAL reported: "Most of the lawyers concerned with labor relations in company administrations now discuss the activities of the National Labor Relations Board with unconcealed joy. In their opinion, the two board members appointed by the Reagan Administration will transfer it from a position in favor of the unions to a track favoring employers."⁴ The lawyers' joy stems primarily from the fact that the reactionary members of the board now control a slight majority of the vote. And after all, this board investigates 50,000-55,000 cases a year pertaining to the working conditions of tens of thousands of workers and hundreds of local labor organizations.⁵

Since the time of its creation, the Department of Labor has traditionally been regarded as a protector of workers and the rights of labor unions, as a "counterbalance" to the Department of Commerce's patronage of business. Although by no means has this always been the case, it nevertheless has had some influence on administration members in charge of labor affairs. Reagan's choice for secretary of labor was the head of a large construction company, the millionaire R. Donovan, who has done everything within his power to please employers--and only employers--as the head of this department.

In recent years the process of so-called decertification has taken on large dimensions. This is the process by which a labor union loses its authorization, conferred by the National Labor Relations Board, to represent labor in negotiations with management.

Corporations are also putting up stronger resistance to the political influence of labor unions, particularly through the more energetic activity of political action committees established by the business community. They campaign for reactionary congressmen, use every means at their disposal to promote the passage of antilabor laws and oppose labor lobbies, etc.

Taking every opportunity to guard monopoly profits and to take the side of the monopolies, Washington officials have instituted severe retaliatory measures against unions resorting to strikes to protect the economic interests of their members (the disgraceful dispersal of the air traffic controllers' union, the prohibition of a strike by transport workers, the victimization of teachers who wanted higher pay, etc.).

Labor's position has also been weakened considerably by the conservative AFL-CIO leaders, who have adhered openly to a line of class cooperation. They support trade-unionist methods but do not fight vigorously enough to unify the members of the working class and to organize the broad laboring masses. The policy of the labor bosses often causes unions to become less militant and, consequently, less appealing to workers.

There has been a constant decrease in the relative number of organized U.S. laborers since the first years after the war. According to Department of Labor statistics, in 1980 there were half a million fewer union members than in 1978. In 1982 the official AFL-CIO organ, AMERICAN FEDERATIONIST, reported that the membership of 11 large unions, primarily in the processing industry, had decreased.⁶ Although these losses have been compensated for, in part, by an

increase in union members in public services and in the civil service, there has been a constant decline in general indicators. In the past year, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT noted in July 1983, the AFL-CIO lost 1.2 million members.⁷ The following fact is also indicative. Although the level of organization in U.S. unions is lower now than at any other time in the entire postwar period, they have had to invest much larger sums than ever before in the maintenance of their organizations. "The unions have to run races just to stay in place," remarked Howard Samuel, head of the AFL-CIO production union department.⁸

When union leaders try to explain the reasons for the reduction of their mass base, they immediately point out the significant job cuts in such long-unionized industries as the automobile, steel, rubber and drayage industries, electronics, light industry and others. But this is only a partial explanation. The most important causes of the organizational weakness of unions is the antilabor policy of monopolies, which have Washington on their side, the passivity of many labor leaders and the inadequacy and inconsistency of their actions in defense of the interests of organized labor. After wondering why they should pay dues to a union giving them no protection, blue- and white-collar workers generally decide not to join.

"Recession in American Labor Unions," "The Crisis of Trade Unionism" and "The U.S. Labor Movement Is Fizzling Out"--headings like these have been a common sight in leading American newspapers and magazines in the last few years. "The labor movement is retreating and is being subjected to increasingly severe attacks," said Anthony Mazzocchi, organizer of the "Management Must Give In" campaign and labor health and safety commissioner of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union. "The whole problem," he said, "is that the leaders of the labor movement have been giving in for so long that they do not even know how to react (to management's new demands). At one time they could get away with making concessions to employers. Today, however, now that management is trying to take away our previous gains, these leaders will have to take the trouble to change their 'modus operandi.' They are resisting this, although many rank-and-file members are ready to begin a counteroffensive."⁹

Of course, conciliation is not the "modus operandi" of all American union leaders. But the main thing is that rank-and-file union members have taken action to prevent this on several occasions. At the beginning of 1983, for example, mine workers gave their union leader, Sam Church, a vote of no confidence and replaced him with Rich Trumka, a lawyer who had promised to put an end to the forced retreat of the miners. The rank-and-file workers in the steel industry twice rejected the terms of labor agreements negotiated behind their backs by the leadership of their union with the owners of large enterprises. Although matters here did not reach the point of a change of leadership, the battle between rank-and-file members and leaders in this union was quite heated. The movement for a change of leadership in the American Federation of Musicians, which was not distinguished by militancy until recently, was even more resolute. In December 1982 a group of orchestra members were able to take control of the New York branch of the union, the largest in the country (with 10,000 members). The new leaders promised to launch a sweeping membership drive and to get better pay for musicians. Of course, in many

such cases, the rebellion against the leadership is complex in nature, and sometimes it is a struggle for power rather than a conflict between progressive and conservative forces. There is no question, however, that the activity of organized labor in general is forcing leaders into more resolute confrontations with capital.

In the first half of last year there were increasingly frequent references in the American press to the "rebirth" of the unions, to their move "from the defensive to the offensive" and to the end of concessions. According to U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, "unions are anxious to shake off the 'concession syndrome' that has engulfed much of organized labor during the past 3 years."¹⁰

The unions are more likely now to reject management's demands during the collective bargaining process. The summer--the traditional time in the United States for the negotiation of new collective agreements between unions and employers--was marked by much more vigorous strikes by American workers in 1983. The strike of the 630,000 blue- and white-collar workers of the large AT&T monopoly was successful. More than 50,000 construction workers in Southern California, 35,000 carpenters in the same state, 10,000 shipbuilders and ship repairmen on the West Coast and steel workers and miners in Arizona went on strike. By the middle of the year the number of large strikes had risen even higher: According to Department of Labor statistics, around 10,000 such strikes (involving 1,000 or more workers) took place just between 1 June and the middle of July, but there were only 20 between January and May.

The resurgence of the labor unions was evident on the local and national levels. Unions are seeking, and are often finding, ways of establishing ties with farmers', religious, women's and other community organizations and involving them in a common struggle against company owners. In Pittsburgh, for example, the United Steel Workers organized a broad community demonstration against the omnipotent Mellon Bank in summer 1983. Local branches of the United Electrical Workers and other labor organizations and 60 local churches joined the campaign to boycott the bank and withdraw accounts from it. In California the United Automobile Workers enlisted the support of many community groups in a struggle against the closure of a Van Nuys assembly plant, which builds Chevrolet Camaros and Pontiac Firebirds. Through their efforts, a joint public appeal was made to stop General Motors from closing the last assembly plant in the state.

The United Automobile Workers and other unions in the Midwest joined militant farmers' organizations to stop big business from foreclosing on farm mortgages and to help these farmers pay off their debts. Several unions have been forming coalitions in the farm belt. "Farmers and unions are starting to realize that they have a lot in common," said Jim Riordan, a prominent figure in the Farm Unity Coalition, which includes such groups as the National Farmers Organization and the American Agriculture Movement. "They are realizing that when a farmer goes out of business, it affects the workers at a tractor plant."¹¹

The increase in union activity has also been noticeable on the national level. This was promoted to a considerable extent by the mass protest marches by

American workers against the Reagan Administration's militarist, undemocratic policy--under the slogan "Jobs, Peace, and Freedom!"--including the 27 August 1983 march by 400,000 workers on Washington. This powerful demonstration was timed to coincide with the 20th anniversary of the famous march on Washington headed by Martin Luther King. The August march and then the September demonstrations by American workers in literally all big American cities on Labor Day attested to the increasing unity of various strata of the American society in the struggle against the monopolies.¹² During these demonstrations, important steps were taken to organize cooperation between labor groups (representatives of more than 100 unions took part in the August march) and their unification with several democratic organizations.

"The coalition which was formed during the preparations for the march issued demands for jobs, peace and freedom," the Communist Party USA organ, DAILY WORLD, reported. "In the future, it could become a force capable of bringing about dramatic changes in the country. If this coalition evolves into an independent political force capable of offering its own platform in future elections, it could lead to the victory of candidates representing the genuine interests of the workers."¹³

After the events of 27 August, the American organized labor movement began the important and difficult job of maintaining united action. This will depend to a considerable extent on the AFL-CIO leaders, on the degree to which they are prepared to fight for the vital interests of the broad laboring masses.

The history of the U.S. labor movement testifies, however, that coalitions like the ones which came into being during the massive demonstrations and marches of the early 1980's often do not have a stable organizational structure and are short-lived, serving primarily for the accomplishment of only specific undertakings and campaigns. There are many reasons for their structural weakness, but one of the main ones is the reluctance or fear of union leaders to head a genuine mass movement. At the time of the August 1983 march, the rightwing upper echelon of the AFL-CIO leadership expressed support for the idea of demonstration but preferred to remain detached from the actual demonstrations and did not even mention the coming events in the issue of its weekly published that day.

The Chicago mayoral election of April 1983 was another vivid example of joint action by the unions and other democratic forces, especially organizations of black Americans. The national leadership of the AFL-CIO usually does not become involved in politics on the local level, but in the case of Chicago it made an exception, supporting the black mayoral candidate, Harold Washington, at the last moment.¹⁴

Unions began to feel more confident of their strength after the 1982 midterm elections. Of the 407 candidates for both congressional houses who were supported by the unions (Democrats in the majority of cases), 258 won.¹⁵ According to AFL-CIO estimates, now 56 percent of the members of the House of Representatives and 43 percent of the senators are "friendly" toward unions. "The November 1982 elections were good for us," declared M. Seager, head of the AFL-CIO press department. "The situation has changed considerably over

the last 2 years. In 1980 Reagan won the votes of 45 percent of our members, but 70 percent voted for Democrats in 1982."¹⁶

In a DAILY WORLD article, General Secretary Gus Hall of the Communist Party USA remarked: "The unions played an important role in the 1982 election defeat of ultra-rightwing candidates, and the plans for union participation in the 1984 presidential election will mark a new level of union activity."¹⁷

As early as 1982 the AFL-CIO executive committee announced that the federation planned to participate openly for the first time in the primaries in 1984 on the side of the Democrats, thereby going against its old tradition of formal neutrality (support was more likely to be given to specific politicians than to an entire party). Explaining the reasons for this early involvement of unions in the campaign, L. Kirkland said: "I think that some of my colleagues have a strong desire to campaign more actively and to act as a united front, collectively, instead of repeating our past experience of splitting into four or five different factions."¹⁸

The 15th AFL-CIO convention in October 1983 in Hollywood (Florida) was a noteworthy event in U.S. politics. The atmosphere was one of harsh criticism of the Reagan Administration's reactionary, antilabor domestic policy, and a resolution was passed in support of Mondale for President. The AFL-CIO leaders again took the side of the Democratic Party in the hope of earning dividends if their candidate should win. They announced that they would contribute close to 20 million dollars to Mondale's campaign. The leaders of the National Education Association, the largest teachers' union in the country, also announced support for Mondale.

In accordance with this strategy, the AFL-CIO has created dozens of "low-level" lobbying committees to pressure local government agencies, especially in regions where the unions represent a definite political force. They are broadening the circle of "their people" in executive and legislative bodies on various levels, issuing information to state and U.S. congressmen and government officials "friendly to the unions," informing the public of the unions' position on various matters and upholding this position in various legislative and administrative institutions. Union lobbyists usually keep a close watch on the alignment of forces in these institutions and assess the loyalty of their personnel, pinpointing the "friends" and "enemies" of labor.

In several cases they have been able to kill some overtly antilabor bills promoted by ultraconservative organizations, such as the National Right To Work Committee. Some of the bills of a clearly antilabor nature were those which "moderated" the right to an 8-hour working day, described picketing as a crime, allowed all sorts of "exceptions" to the legal minimum wage in the case of minors, etc. Under the pressure of unions, the Democrats, who represent the majority in the U.S. House of Representatives, voted against these bills.¹⁹

The AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education and the political bodies of various unions have been particularly active in the current campaign. These

associations are mobilizing all of their functional committees: registration, organizational, financial, examination, women's and public relations committees. In addition to publishing numerous brochures, leaflets and so forth, these political committees are using radio and television on a broader scale for propaganda purposes. An eight-part documentary, "America Works," began to be shown on television in July 1983 to heighten the prestige and influence of labor unions, to describe their work and their problems and to make their views known to the American public. The film was commissioned by the AFL-CIO and cost 600,000 dollars to make. To the same end, the Communications Workers of America made a radio and television public-affairs series, "Rewiring Your World," focusing on problems connected with the use of the industry's latest technology. According to union estimates, 5.6 million people saw the first three installments.²⁰

At some time in the future, closer to Election Day, the unions plan large-scale undertakings to strengthen ties with the "friends of labor," primarily Democrats.

Not all of the unions intend to support this party's candidates in the 1984 elections, however. Ronald Reagan and his party have their own fans, and quite ardent ones, in the labor movement, particularly in construction workers' organizations. In spite of the AFL-CIO leaders' criticism of various aspects of the administration's domestic policy, the leaders of construction workers' unions, headed by Robert Georgine, have been friendly with the White House. These men justify their attachment on the grounds that jobs for their members are their main concern, and this is why they do not want to "ruin their relationship" with the President.

He is also supported actively by the leaders of the largest segment of organized labor--the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America. The administration has closed its eyes to the fact that the head of the union, Jack Presser, is under investigation: The Department of Labor is investigating the embezzlement of union funds and other manipulations in which this labor boss is implicated. According to one of Presser's assistants, "he should already have spent a good 10 years in jail for his shady dealings." Nevertheless, Presser, according to the WASHINGTON POST, is a frequent and welcome guest at various events organized by top administration officials.²¹

By supporting Ronald Reagan and his policy, these labor leaders are demonstrating their selfish approach to vitally important problems of the organized labor movement. In connection with this, the WASHINGTON POST remarked that the position of several labor leaders "corroborates the existence of a political split in the U.S. labor movement."²²

The same two opposing tendencies are still characteristic of the U.S. labor movement of our day. One of them, the prevailing one, consists in attempts by the unions to adapt to the two-party system and to effect broader cooperation with the two main bourgeois parties. The other is connected with the increasing activity of the working class, more frequent strikes and the desire of the laboring public for united action within the framework of the organized labor movement.

The first tendency is personified by the rightwing leaders of the AFL-CIO, who have openly adhered to a line of class cooperation.

L. Kirkland and other conservative AFL-CIO leaders make a show of opposing the "reordering of priorities" and the excessively high military budget and criticize the administration's economic policy, which is continuously lowering the standard of living of a large segment of the laboring public. But they are also supporting the foreign policy of the White House, and this is corroborated by many resolutions of executive committee sessions and other documents. For example, although they assisted in labor's powerful antiwar marches on Washington in 1982 and 1983, the rightwing AFL-CIO leaders simultaneously nullified these positive actions by channeling the peace movement against the "overseas" enemy instead of against the forces posing a real threat to peace in the United States.

The conservative AFL-CIO leaders were quite energetic in their support of the White House's announced campaign to propagandize American "democracy" abroad, for which a total of 20 million dollars was allocated just in 1983. The campaign assigns a special role to international activity by the AFL-CIO. In particular, funds are to be allocated for overseas labor organization programs, including "information about U.S. foreign policy and defense" (4.8 million dollars), aid to "democratic" labor unions and national central labor organizations "in particularly important regions and countries" (8.5 million dollars) and "informational exchanges" between unions (3 million dollars).²³

Project "Democracy," aimed at more active global ideological subversive activity by American imperialism, acquired distinct outlines in the past year. In April a "national fund for the support of democracy" was formed at Reagan's suggestion. The rightwing leadership of the AFL-CIO received the news of its creation with pleasure. Explaining how the federation planned to use the money in this fund, Kirkland announced that his association would "help those who are fighting for the survival of 'Solidarity' in Poland." In these matters, the AFL-CIO president said, his organization "has considerable experience." Kirkland's 1983 appointment as a member of the board of the federal International Broadcasting Agency, under whose auspices the American Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe stations operate, indicated that his personal experience in provocation will probably be enriched within the near future.

Last year the AFL-CIO made several new attempts to increase its influence in Central America, South Africa, India, Turkey and other countries and regions. The strong and highly diversified foreign policy machinery of the AFL-CIO serves U.S. ruling circles faithfully by promoting their anticommunist, imperialist policy.

As for the second tendency, which is connected with the progressive development of the U.S. labor movement, the year of 1983 provided several examples of its growth. Above all, there was the abovementioned strong opposition by organized labor to the Reagan Administration's undemocratic and militarist policy.

The huge August march on Washington alone brought more than 80,000 union members together. Traditional Labor Day demonstrations were held in 150 cities

on 5 September; according to the AFL-CIO information department, at least half a million people gathered for these demonstrations.²⁴

The organized workers of the steel, clothing, textile and food industries, teachers, furriers and electrical workers have demanded an immediate nuclear freeze from U.S. ruling circles. "Never in the last 30 years has the American public been so disturbed by the threat of a new world war,"²⁵ remarked J. Sweeney, president of the Service Employees International Union, in the organization's newspaper, SERVICE EMPLOYEE.

A conference in San Francisco in April 1983 was attended by 200 labor activists. The reactionary foreign policy line of the current U.S. administration was criticized from various vantage points. The keynote speaker was William Winpisinger, the president of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers. He accused Washington ruling circles of trying to escalate the arms race to the detriment of the vital interests of the laboring public. "A billion dollars spent on weapons," Winpisinger said, "will create 45,800 jobs, but the same amount invested in civilian branches could secure jobs for 98,000 people."²⁶ The labor leader condemned the Washington extremists' plans for preparations for "star wars."

The August 1983 trip to the Soviet Union by a delegation from the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, headed by W. Winpisinger, and the meeting of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Yuriy Andropov with the head of the American delegation had great repercussions in U.S. labor circles.

New leaders are striving to revitalize the labor movement and to direct it into the channel of struggle for social progress and lasting peace and against the threat of nuclear war.

The working class is growing increasingly dissatisfied with the two-party system in the country. This dissatisfaction, however, has been expressed in different ways. Those with a low level of political awareness are inclined to blame individuals rather than the entire political system. Others realize the need for change but do not know how to bring it about and express their protests in a purely negative manner, boycotting all political undertakings and refusing to support any of the two bourgeois parties. Finally, there are those who are openly challenging the two-party system. Although the last group is still relatively small, the number of those advocating the creation of a third mass party is growing. Rank-and-file union members and the more farsighted leaders of labor associations are now more inclined to favor independent political action. This was discussed at conventions of machinists, steel workers, automobile workers, miners, etc. And this is significant because for many years the majority of labor leaders told workers that the creation of an independent labor party would be unnecessary, useless and even "harmful."

"Corporate strategy," W. Winpisinger said in June 1983, "consists in dominating both of the main political parties under a bipartisan cover." When a NEW YORK TIMES correspondent asked if Reagan would win the election if

unemployment and interest rates stayed at around 10 percent, Winpisinger replied: "He can win only on one condition: only if the Democrats do not offer an alternative promising us a better future."²⁷

The Republican administration does not want to consider the wishes of the laboring public. This will inevitably make the masses more radical. They are learning through their own experience that they cannot improve their social position by making only economic demands. The socioeconomic and political facts of life in the United States are teaching the workers and are urging them to fight for their own interests. The current changes in public opinion will have an unavoidable effect on the conditions of the continuous class struggle.

FOOTNOTES

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3. POLITICAL AFFAIRS, December 1982, p 32.
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5. POLITICAL AFFAIRS, December 1982, p 32.
6. AMERICAN FEDERATIONIST, March 1982, p 20.
7. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 25 July 1983, p 75.
8. Ibid., 14 November 1981, p 61.
9. LA VIE OUVRIERE, 21 March 1983.
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11. Ibid.
12. STEELABOR, September 1983, p 8.
13. DAILY WORLD, 25 September 1983.
14. LABOR TODAY, May 1983, p 1.
15. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 15 November 1982, p 80.
16. LE MONDE, 12 May 1983.
17. DAILY WORLD, 1 September 1983.
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19. LE MONDE, 12 May 1983.
20. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 25 July 1983, p 76.
21. THE WASHINGTON POST, 18 August 1983.
22. Ibid., 13 February 1983.
23. THE WASHINGTON POST, 25 February 1983. For more about this campaign, see SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1983, No 7, pp 55-61.
24. STEELABOR, September 1983, p 8.
25. SERVICE EMPLOYEE, August 1983.
26. DAILY WORLD, 13 April 1983.
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THE NAVY--TRADITIONAL INSTRUMENT OF AMERICAN INTERVENTIONISM

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 84 (signed to press 21 Dec 83) pp 32-41

[Article by B. D. Yashin]

[Text] During the years of the Reagan Administration the American military and naval presence in various parts of the world has turned into broad-scale, overt intervention in the affairs of sovereign states. The arbitrary definition of large bodies of water, whole continents and specific countries as zones of U.S. "vital interests" has become an increasingly characteristic practice in Washington's pursuit of its interventionist goals. The U.S. Navy's aggressive, provocative behavior has been uninterrupted in several parts of the world ocean. This applies above all to "zones of instability," which are actually regions where people do not want to accept American authoritarianism and where the situation is consequently unfavorable, according to the White House, for the United States.

Large-scale joint maneuvers involving the naval forces of the United States, England and Holland were held in the Caribbean basin in April-May 1983 under the supervision of the American naval command. Around 80 naval ships and up to 400 planes took part in them. As Admiral J. Watkins, U.S. chief of naval operations, said at that time, the joint exercises were designed to prove that NATO was capable of transferring bloc forces "if necessary," wherever the course of events might need to be influenced. Militaristic shows of naval strength were begun by Washington last July in Central America. For example, it was in direct proximity to Nicaragua and El Salvador that the "Big Pine-2" maneuvers, American-Honduran "exercises" of unprecedented duration and composition for this part of the world, were conducted. In addition to a contingent of the "rapid deployment force," three strategic attack forces and carrier task forces of the American Navy were concentrated in the region. They carried around 16,500 personnel and up to 200 planes and helicopters.

A large task force from the Sixth Fleet,¹ with the nuclear aircraft carrier "Eisenhower" in the lead, was sent to the shores of Libya and Lebanon. In September Washington authorized the direct use of the fire power of naval ships against the Lebanese and Palestinians, and against Syrian armed forces in Lebanon as part of the inter-Arab security force.

When the shows of naval strength against Nicaragua and El Salvador began, President Reagan declared that in Central America, just as in other parts of the world, the United States supposedly wants to aid in the protection of democracy and "human rights" and supports economic development and negotiations. He alleged that Washington had no plans to intervene and that the United States had no intention of building up the American military presence abroad, but that the combat maneuvers scheduled up to March 1984 would "contribute to the relaxation of tension."

Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger discussed the situation much more frankly. When he was interviewed by USA TODAY, he said: "These maneuvers are designed to demonstrate our ability to quickly concentrate sizeable military contingents." In other words, according to Pentagon plans, all of these shows of strength are not only designed specifically to reinforce the threat of intervention in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Lebanon and Libya, but also to "inspire fear" in all countries of Latin America, Africa and the Middle East.

It should be noted that the use of the navy as an instrument of "global power politics" has been a traditional part of the interventionist plans of U.S. ruling circles.

According to the data of the Brookings Institution, in the 215 cases in which U.S. armed forces were used in postwar conflicts and wars, the Army was used 39 times, the Air Force was used 103 times and the Navy was used 177 times. The scales of the use of naval strength are also attested to by the following statistics: 15 of the 17 American aircraft carriers, 6 of the 8 helicopter carriers and around 90 percent of other surface ships of the American Navy took part in combat during the Vietnam War.

The interventionist function of the American Navy was demonstrated even more clearly last October and November, when Washington went against all standards of international law by setting large forces from the U.S. Navy, Air Force and Marines against Grenada, an independent Caribbean country. American maneuvers were launched near the shores of Cuba.

The use of the navy as an instrument of American interventionism dates back to the turn of the century. Even then, strong armed forces, especially the naval "big stick," were regarded as an important and quite reliable instrument for the attainment of the political and economic goals of U.S. ruling circles. Military doctrine, representing the combination of all current military political and strategic theories, was geared to the constant buildup of naval strength. Above all, this presupposed the rapid creation of the world's largest and most modern navy.

At the beginning of this century, the U.S. leadership chose the doctrine describing naval strength as an instrument for the decisive modification of historical events, a doctrine elaborated at the beginning of this century by Rear Admiral A. Mahan² and earnestly publicized by his supporters and followers, as a politico-military and ideological basis.³ When the office of the presidency was occupied by Theodore Roosevelt, who had gained a belief in the navy's role as a "big stick" for the maintenance of U.S. supremacy in the

world when he was still the assistant secretary of the Navy, Mahan's expansionist theories gained influential support.

It was no coincidence, incidentally, that the fourth nuclear aircraft carrier of the "Nimitz" type, one of the largest and most modern ships in the American Navy, the construction of which began in 1981, was called the "Theodore Roosevelt." The January 1983 issue of the U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS accurately saw the symbolism in this, calling it evidence of the current administration's "firm resolve" to "restore the greatness of the American Navy" and to "make use of past experience."

Mahan, whose ideas about the "decisive influence of naval strength" on the history of the United States and of several other NATO countries were widely quoted in the past and are now being glorified and used as the theoretical basis of military doctrines, gave the most aggressive segments of the American bourgeoisie, distinguished by the most expansionist aims, what they regarded as a universal and convincing creed for the entire range of international relations. It was precisely on his recommendations that the administration of Theodore Roosevelt drew up and carried out an extensive program for the construction of a strong U.S. Navy and for its provision with powerful weapons. This program included plans for the acquisition of a diversified network of naval bases and support points outside the United States.

In the last 10-12 years, particularly at the beginning of the 1980's, Mahan's military-strategic views have been cited and amplified in numerous publications designed to validate the goals and aims of military policy, to stimulate a buildup and to justify the present and future functions of the chief element of sea power--the Navy. A short but significant editorial comment on an article by L. Preen, a staff military correspondent of SEA POWER, the magazine of the Navy League of the United States, might be of interest in this connection. It said: "The 19th-century doctrine of sea power, which was considered to be old-hat until recently, is now being reassessed by the new engineers of Pentagon military plans."⁴

The publication of color portraits of Admiral A. Mahan, clutching his book "The Influence of Sea Power Upon History" to his breast, in several recent issues of U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS also seems symbolic. The words accompanying the pictures extol the admiral--for example: "It is a tribute to Mahan that his ideas live on, not only in tradition and in history, but also in the minds of those who will help to build the navies of the future."⁵

Therefore, both the political basis of Mahan's views--expansionism and interventionism--and his military-strategic outlook--reflected in the doctrine of "sea power" and in the ideas of "command of the sea" and "control of the sea"--have been in existence for a long time, have been updated and revived, have once again become a field of study and are being applied to new international situations under various, generally unscrupulous, pretexts.

A more thorough analysis of the present state, functions and developmental tendencies of the U.S. Navy will require a brief look at the evolution of the still-existent idea of "control of the sea."

According to Mahan, "control of the sea" generally presupposed defensive actions to ensure the security of sea lanes and commercial shipping. The "command of the sea," on the other hand, presupposed offensive military actions, including the violation of enemy sea lanes, the debilitation of forces defending them and the destruction of the enemy's principal naval forces and their bases.

For many years, "command of the sea" in its previous political, strategic and, what is most important, global sense, has been impossible because even a side having smaller forces but possessing modern weapons can put up considerable resistance and regularly or sporadically undermine another side's absolute supremacy in large sections of the world ocean.

In addition, it is significant that even the idea of "control of the sea" has changed somewhat in the past two decades. In particular, now it is closely connected with the concept of "superior strength," which is part of the American political and military vocabulary used in appraisals of the balance of power and, above all, in appeals for a buildup of U.S. military strength as a counterbalance to Soviet strength. In U.S. scientific and administrative naval circles, naval superiority means "the degree to which one side is dominant over the opposing side, allowing it to engage in military actions with its own and its friends' navies, ground troops and aviation for a specific length of time and in a specific part of the sea and its air space without being stopped by enemy forces."⁶

Besides this, the concept of "control of the sea" has taken on a more aggressive and offensive nature. In 1962, when President J. F. Kennedy spoke on board the aircraft carrier "Kitty Hawk" and substantiated the need for the U.S. Navy to control strategic regions of the world ocean, he reaffirmed the invariability of the U.S. goal of establishing and maintaining the dominant influence in the world. In particular, he said that "control of the sea will make the United States secure, can guarantee peace and should lead to victory."⁷ Furthermore, Kennedy anticipated the appeals of subsequent presidents by insisting on the restoration of American superiority in the seas and oceans and on the alleged urgent need "to gain a free hand" in the world ocean by renovating the U.S. Navy and merchant marine as quickly as possible.

Former Secretary of Defense D. Rumsfeld defined the concept of "control of the sea" more specifically as domination: "Establishing control of the sea consists in acquiring the ability to control the air space, surface and depths of the world ocean, in which the United States is interested.... It must be capable of achieving this kind of control wherever and whenever necessary."⁸

"Control" therefore presupposes a broad range of military-strategic undertakings. It is absolutely obvious that the main purpose of these undertakings is the establishment and maximal maintenance of favorable military-strategic conditions and a positive naval balance of power in certain parts of the world ocean in order to maintain the U.S. Navy's superiority to the forces of a possible adversary. This also presupposes a permanent and more impressive presence of specially created naval task forces in these regions and the maintenance of their permanent and mobile basing system.

Discussions about the "validity" and the "exceptional" importance of the U.S. naval presence in the world ocean are also popular among top-level members of the Reagan Administration. For example, Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger said in one of his first statements to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "American trade and industry, our access to vitally important sources and the material resources of the Western allies depend on the United States' ability to control the sea." In reference to the purpose of the continuous buildup of naval strength and the expansion of its sphere of application, he stressed that the United States "must be capable of defeating any adversary putting our plans in peril. This is a field of military activity in which the terms 'equality,' 'parity' and all other terms of this kind are meaningless. We must attain naval superiority."⁹ In 1982, when Weinberger spoke at the Naval Academy commencement exercises, he repeated this militarist creed.¹⁰ He made the far from truthful statement that the United States does not want war but must arm itself to prevent others from starting a war. In this address, the Pentagon chief listed the already well-known chief premises of the U.S. position on arms control, which are employed on all levels of the administration: The United States will not give up the possibility of starting and fighting a nuclear war; it will not agree to a freeze on nuclear weapons. According to Weinberger, this would supposedly change the "formula of deterrence" and put the United States and its allies in a "militarily inferior position."

In his report to the Congress on the U.S. military budget for fiscal year 1984 and military programs for 1984-1988, Weinberger hypocritically made the far from truthful remarks that the United States is not preparing for war but is merely "gathering strength to ward off Soviet threats." After relating a number of stories about "Soviet threats" to U.S. interests and security on the global level, he made a number of recommendations regarding U.S. military policy and the role and place of the navy in this policy and told how the Soviet Union could be "overtaken" in terms of military strength and how its challenges should be "repulsed" by U.S. armed forces "weakened" by budgetary "restrictions." Future programs for the buildup of the armed forces occupied a prominent place in the report. Weinberger reaffirmed the current belief in the new politico-military strategy of "direct confrontation" and in one of its important elements--U.S. naval strategy.¹¹

Underscoring the significance and role of the navy, he said: "To secure the implementation of American military strategy in distant regions, the navy, in conjunction with allied forces and properly trained components of the army and air force, must be capable, and this should be obvious, of taking action with the aid of advanced deployment and U.S. access to all regions of vital interest in spite of existing opposition."¹²

Weinberger also spoke of the "importance" of learning from the experience of the Anglo-Argentine conflict in the South Atlantic. He said that this war inspired the United States with a belief in the need to create stronger naval forces, sufficient for the successful attainment of objectives in the world ocean and the defense of American armed forces deployed in distant parts of the world. The secretary of defense asserted that this conflict had reassured the U.S. military leadership that the navy should include multipurpose carrier task forces with AWACS planes, effective long-range fighter-bombers and other

means of ensuring the survival of surface ships in a situation involving the extensive use of antiship missiles and electronic defensive equipment.

Endorsing the proposed quantitative and qualitative components of the latest 5-year program of shipbuilding and the modernization of obsolete ships and other vessels, Weinberger said that the conventional fleet should increase from 506 vessels at the end of 1983 to 610 by the beginning of 1990. Of the total 506, the following are to be ready for action in 1983: 34 nuclear missile submarines, 13 aircraft carriers, 1 battleship, 97 cruisers and destroyers, 91 nuclear submarines, 5 diesel-powered submarines, 95 frigates, 60 amphibious ships and 73 military transport ships.

Five nuclear missile submarines of the Trident system are to be built before the end of 1988, as well as 21 nuclear submarines with torpedo mountings and cruise missiles, another nuclear multipurpose carrier of the Nimitz type, 14 guided-missile cruisers, 9 guided-missile destroyers, 6 antisubmarine ships, 25 antimine ships, 3 large amphibious ships, 2 tenders for destroyers, 19 fleet tankers, etc. The program for the modernization of all four battleships is to be completed (the battleship "New Jersey" is already being used in shows of U.S. military strength).¹³

Therefore, by 1990 the Pentagon intends to complete its long-charted program to increase the number of naval ships to 600 units of the main categories; this has been called the "minimum necessary" number for the establishment and maintenance of American superiority in the world ocean. Furthermore, over 40 submarines are to be designated for strategic forces and up to 100 other nuclear submarines and at least 15 "multipurpose carrier task forces" are to serve as the basis of conventional forces.¹⁴ An important feature of the program is the increased fire power of surface ships and submarines, at least 150 of which will be equipped with antisubmarine missile launching systems. Considering the much longer range of missiles with nuclear warheads, these measures will give the United States even more strategic offensive potential.

It is no secret that the Reagan Administration's military policy of "direct confrontation" has been supplemented by the appropriate naval strategy. In interviews and special statements, Secretary of the Navy J. Lehman has quite thoroughly and dramatically described the new elements with which naval strategy and naval objectives have been "enriched." For example, he has said that the principal change in the new naval policy and the related ocean strategy consists in a departure from the Reagan Administration's earlier assumptions of American naval actions in regions with less tension, and in the return of the navy to regions posing the greatest threat to U.S. vital interests, where Soviet claims and challenges require resolute opposition.¹⁵

The secretary described naval objectives with regard to the Soviet Union as the following: "The U.S. Navy must be capable of moving north of the Greenland-Iceland-England frontier to protect NATO's northern flank and contain Soviet forces beyond Tromso in northern Norway. The U.S. Navy should take a position from which it could strike at the Kola Peninsula."¹⁶ In August 1981 J. Lehman confirmed the expansionist and interventionist purpose of the navy by declaring that the war for the seas would not be confined to any one geographic

region but would be of a global nature, to which end the United States should quickly build a navy equipped with the offensive weapons needed for superiority in the seas. He also said that that time that the leadership of the U.S. Navy "does not want to reconcile itself to parity with the Soviet Union." "We," he said, "must have guaranteed access to all regions," which would require the kind of superior strength that would preclude "Soviet plans to violate American sea lanes"¹⁷ (these plans, as we know, live only in Lehman's imagination). Finally, the clearest endorsement of the postulates of the "new" ocean strategy on the top level of the American administration was Ronald Reagan's statement at the end of 1983 in Long Beach when the work of modernizing the "New Jersey" had been completed (this is one of four ships of this category which are to be included in the naval fleet before 1987). Recalling the United States' "past glory" as a great sea power and not forgetting to underscore the fact that President T. Roosevelt took the "greatest trouble" to acquire naval greatness for the United States, Ronald Reagan said: "The return of this colossal ship to the fleet represents an important step in the fulfillment of our commitment to re-equip the American military arsenal. This marks the rebirth of our national strength." He then went on to say: "We need naval superiority. We must be capable of taking risks in emergencies and of controlling the air space, surface and depths of the seas to secure access to all of the world's oceans." He then repeated that all of this would require that U.S. forces be "second to none."¹⁸

The real meaning of this phrase has been known since Mahan's time. Another statement by the U.S. President was also noteworthy: He implied that the Soviet Union "has no right" to enter the world ocean and that its concern about the safety of the maritime borders of the USSR and the navigation of international waters by Soviet military and transport ships are "legally invalid."

In connection with this, we should recall at least these well-known facts. The Russian fleet had centuries of experience in navigating nearby and distant waters. In 1863 Russia sent its Atlantic and Pacific squadrons, with the consent of the American Government, to the ports of New York and San Francisco, where they spent almost a year helping the United States maintain its government and secure the defense of these ports and nearby territories.¹⁹

Those who try to confuse the world public by alleging that the presence of Soviet military ships and vessels in oceans is "extraordinary" and "wrong" should recall the statements made in this connection by two former heads of the U.S. and English governments. In 1945 English Prime Minister W. Churchill officially declared: "I acknowledge that a people as great and powerful as the Russians, who contributed so much to the common cause, should be greeted cordially in the oceans. We will welcome the appearance of the Russian flag on the seas." That same year, President Truman of the United States acknowledged in some of his statements that the Soviet Union indisputably warranted "free access to all of the world's seas."²⁰

The idea of expanding the interventionist functions of the American Navy, which has been a popular topic of discussion in military publications in recent years, has also been the subject of numerous articles in the U.S. press. For

example, in an article about the preservation and reinforcement of the Atlantic alliance, Admiral H. Train, who commanded the NATO Atlantic naval forces and the U.S. Atlantic Command until recently, placed special emphasis on the need to make the American naval presence more "impressive," accomplish the "joint augmentation" of Atlantic and Pacific forces when necessary and pressure the NATO allies to increase their participation in the buildup of all components of this bloc's military and naval strength.²¹

Naval officer E. Giampoler, the author of another article in the same magazine, discussed "American vital interests," insisting on the accelerated development of the naval component of the "rapid deployment force" and advising the reinforcement of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and the completion of the Fifth Fleet in the Indian Ocean.

Another article, by a zealous supporter of the unlimited reinforcement of American naval strength, Rear Admiral (retired) J. Miller, also preaches U.S. great-power ambitions. He advises the U.S. military leadership to discard the "continental" strategy that has been used by all branches of the armed services for a long time. This is a strategy geared primarily to combat on land. Without calling his proposed strategy for all U.S. armed forces an "ocean" strategy (the official declaration of this strategy was still being prevented by the Pentagon leadership in the first half of the 1970's),²² the author quite clearly endorses it. He earnestly recommends that the navy be considered the chief component of U.S. military strength. After its projected modernization, the admiral said, it could "establish and maintain the dominant position of the United States" on the seas and on land with the support of other branches of the armed services in all important parts of the world. Just as Mahan once did, Miller suggested in his article that U.S. government agencies renounce all international and bilateral commitments placing restrictions on the buildup of naval strength and thereby reducing the U.S. capability to pursue a policy of naval hegemony.²³

It is indicative that the journal of the U.S. Naval Institute has recently printed more articles about the need to improve the theoretical and tactical training of naval officers. As a rule, these articles stress that the mounting "threat" supposedly posed by the Soviet Navy requires more thorough and serious appraisals of the role of the navy and the balance of power in the world ocean, particularly the U.S.-Soviet balance. In an article published in June 1983 and related directly to this issue, R. Powers, the commander of a tactical naval force who previously worked in operational, research and engineering divisions of the U.S. Navy, advised--"with consideration for the instructions of Admiral J. Watkins, the new chief of naval operations"--the thorough improvement of the operational and tactical thinking of the naval command, making a number of statements indicating the substantial modification and considerable expansion of the concept of "control of the sea."

It was no coincidence that the section of his article subheaded "Theory and Strategy" was situated next to a picture of President Reagan being honored on board the battleship "New Jersey" when he appealed for the quickest possible achievement of absolute naval superiority in the world ocean. Powers says: "U.S. national strategy is now clearer than it has been for two decades. It is based on the following:

"Reliable parity for the United States and a secured level of nuclear strength in the event of a nuclear conflict;

"A naval presence secured by the quantitative augmentation of the naval fleet to 600 ships of the main categories, designed for all-round control of the sea in support of American global interests;

"The maintenance of politico-military control over the escalation of a possible conflict during the defense of U.S. interests;

"The accomplishment of American presence overseas in conjunction with allies;

"The combat-ready maintenance of limited contingents of ground forces capable of rapid deployment in crisis situations."²⁴

In the implementation of this "national strategy," the author explains, the U.S. Navy is guided by the need to maintain "absolute control of the sea." Furthermore, he, just as Mahan, also uses the term "command of the sea," which is stronger than the term "control of the sea" because it presupposes the achievement of supremacy by the U.S. Navy in several parts of the world ocean.

After confirming the interventionist essence of American naval objectives, Powers goes on to place special emphasis on the need to give up defensive aims in naval tactics and in various joint operations involving ships and naval aviation. He advises the even more thorough analysis of new regions of the world ocean with a view to the development of forces and means of combating enemy submarines, preparations for offensive actions during sea warfare, the mastery of electronic means of warfare and the investigation of specific topics in this field.

These official statements by top-level members of the political and military leadership and articles by many military and naval specialists testify conclusively that the prevailing U.S. views on the role and purpose of the American Navy are of an aggressive, interventionist nature.

The position of the U.S. Navy in the strategic "triad," where it accounts for over 50 percent of all independently targetable nuclear warheads, is well known. The navy is the main component of general-purpose forces in peacetime and in times of crisis. It performs one of the main functions connected with the naval presence in most regions of the world ocean; in addition to this, the navy secures shows of U.S. military strength²⁵ and threatens the use of force in all "hot spots" on the planet; it supports reactionary regimes; it has combat-ready forces and the means to transfer and land amphibious forces of various sizes; it has been assigned the duty of controlling the most important sea and ocean lanes.

The interventionist and expansionist nature of the military-strategic premises of the construction, modernization, arming and operational direction of the navy, particularly under the Reagan Administration, totally confirms the fact that the U.S. Navy is a traditional instrument of aggressive foreign policy.

Mahan's theory about the "decisive influence of sea power" is still one of Washington's ideological weapons. Its current interpretation and modes of utilization are paving the way for the continuation of the race for naval arms and are justifying interventionism as a method of attaining the imperialist goals of U.S. ruling circles.

FOOTNOTES

1. For many years the U.S. Navy has been distinguished by an administrative organization dividing it into two commands--Atlantic and Pacific--and operational divisions--the Second, Third, Sixth and Seventh fleets--characteristic of wartime. The Second Fleet is based and deployed on the East Coast of the United States and in the North and Central Atlantic; the Third is on the West Coast and in the North and Central Pacific; the Sixth is in the Mediterranean; the Seventh is in the Southwest Pacific. The large strategic unit in the Indian Ocean is supposed to become the Fifth Fleet.
2. Alfred T. Mahan was born in 1840. After graduating from the Naval Academy in 1859, he served in the American Navy until 1896. For most of his naval career and his retirement, he studied the military and naval history of sea powers, adapting his conclusions regarding the effects of sea power on history to the interests of the United States and its attainment of a dominant position in the world. For more detail, see I. P. Dement'yev, "Alfred Mahan's Doctrine of Sea Power," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1972, No 5--Editor's note.
3. In 1890 A. Mahan's book "The Influence of Sea Power Upon History. 1660-1783" was published in Boston and gained renown in many countries. In 1941 a translation of the book was published in the USSR.
4. SEA POWER, April 1981, p 15.
5. See, for example, U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, June 1983, p 12.
6. J. Collins, "Grand Strategy Principles and Practices," Annapolis, 1973, p 277.
7. Quoted in: W. Baldwin, "Strategy for Tomorrow," N.Y., 1972, p 294.
8. U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, February 1977, p 21.
9. Quoted in: SEA POWER, April 1981, p 13.
10. U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, July 1982, p 70.
11. "Report of the Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger to the Congress on the FY 1984 Budget...", Wash., February 1983, pp 16, 19, 23, 26, 27, 29, 31, 33.

12. Ibid., p 139.
13. Ibid., p 159.
14. Counting reserves, the U.S. Navy has 856 ships and vessels (including 394 of the main categories) and over 5,000 planes and helicopters. Some details of the plan for the augmentation of the U.S. fleet can also be found in the article "All Ahead Flank: Reagan Defense Program Picks Up Steam," SEA POWER, February 1983.
15. SEA POWER, April 1981, p 13.
16. Ibid., p 21.
17. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 31 August 1981, p 44.
18. SEA POWER, February 1983, pp 13, 15.
19. For more detail, see S. A. Zonin, "Russian Squadrons in the United States (1863-1864)," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1974, No 7, pp 58-63.
20. Quoted in: MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN', 1965, No 12, p 140; 1966, No 3, p 157.
21. U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, January 1981, p 24.
22. For some of the details of the so-called "ocean strategy," see G. M. Sturua, "The United States: Reliance on 'Ocean Strategy'?" SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1982, No 11.
23. U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, December 1982, p 44.
24. Ibid., June 1983, p 25.
25. V. V. Potashov et al, "The United States: Shows of Strength as a Policy Instrument," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1982, No 5--Editor's note.

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ADZHUBEY RECALLS 1961 INTERVIEW WITH PRESIDENT KENNEDY

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 84 (signed to press 21 Dec 83) pp 55-62

[Article by A. I. Adzhubey: "Returning to an Interview with President Kennedy; Notes of a Journalist"]

[Text] On 22 November 1963, John F. Kennedy, the 35th President of the United States of America, was killed by a shot from a sniper's rifle (or by shots from several rifles, according to some versions). The tragedy in Dallas stunned the world. However much they tried to ascribe an exceptional, pathological and personal-revenge character to what had happened, this tragedy was far more important for what it said about America than for what it was in itself.

It was not the first time that a President had been killed in America, and it was not the first time that a bullet had been fired at someone objectionable. But Kennedy? A symbol of dynamism and energy, a man who inspired Americans, particularly the young, with the hope of better times....

In the scores of books and hundreds of versions of this assassination which have aroused the interest of a large group of readers until now, the connections are often obscured. Just as in the case of widening ripples on the water's surface, the "point of origination" is hardly discernible in later years. Sentimental deliberations often obscure the facts. However, one undoubtedly sincere and moving recapitulation perhaps deserves to be cited. It was made by writer Vance Bourjailly, author of the book "The Man Who Knew Kennedy."

"You may be the richest and the handsomest man, one invested with the greatest power. You may be witty, charming and married to a fascinating woman whom the fashion world follows. You may be the son of a strong and powerful man, have a cohort of mighty brothers, be the father of wonderful children and the friend and patron of the wisest poet, and be lucky enough to have cheated death a score of times. You may be the youngest elected representative of the people in your own country, in the entire world....

"But an insignificant, high-strung little fellow, a sniper of the fairground type moves up stealthily with a rifle as though in delirium and, if the

finger, obedient to an inflamed imagination, pulls the trigger for a completely real shot, you are finished."

Both Vance Bourjailly and the hero of his book, which so resembles a documentary novel, loved the President. They were among those who awaited the miracle of American renaissance. The miracle did not happen. Vance's hero is less afraid for himself than for his children and for the future of America. Their deliberations amount to one sad thought: You see what a single bullet can do....

One can understand those who mourned Kennedy. The fact that emotions outweighed the dry logic of facts for a while is also understandable. This gust of emotions had its mechanical springs and its truth. But not the whole truth, and not only the truth. The ancient Romans thought that one should speak only well of the deceased or not at all. If mankind always followed this rule, however, we would have an apologia for the past instead of history. There is no getting away from the fact that J. F. Kennedy was a controversial figure in American history, just as the period of his brief presidency was also controversial.

These notes do not pretend to be an analysis of the complex activity of Kennedy or to draw a more or less complete picture of the international situation of that time.

You cannot bring back the past. Just as in any other case, it is senseless to use the subjunctive: if only.... It is important that lessons for the future be drawn from the past.

Would anyone in the United States really want to know the real reason for the President's death? Robert Kennedy said that only another U.S. President could find that out. He, the brother of the dead President, wanted to become that other President. He campaigned actively and reached the finishing line far ahead of his competitors. This is what the American press reported at the time. Public opinion polls also attested to this fact. Robert Kennedy would quite possibly have won the election. They killed him. And this was followed by yet another crime: They also killed the wise Martin Luther King, the favorite of black America and honest white America, a man who believed in a brighter future for the country. This was the magnitude of the warning and of the determination of the people behind all of these crimes. They opened fire on various flanks to make their shots more effective and reliable. The echos of the shots were a command to change course.

To this very day I can visualize a huge concert hall in Paris, where a concert by our Red Banner Ensemble was in progress. At some point during the evening a man in black unexpectedly appeared on stage. Only those sitting nearby saw that there were tears running down his face. He had difficulty speaking. Finally he managed to say, in a shout instead of a normal speaking voice, "President Kennedy has been killed!"

How long did the silence last? What did those present think and feel? I do not know. I do remember something else. Boris Aleksandrov, director of the

troupe, appeared in front of the chorus. He raised his hands and signaled the orchestra. The sounds of a funeral melody echoed in the hall. Everyone in the hall stood. In this way, far from home, expressing a natural feeling of compassion, the Soviet military performers paid their sorrowful tribute to John Kennedy, President of the United States of America.

The next day a group of Soviet journalists visited the L'HUMANITE editorial office. Editor Rene Andrieu tore off some teletype copy and read us the Soviet Government's condolence message. I remember some of the remarks the journalists made to one another at the time: "How terrible. But in that country anything could happen." Incidentally, the President was aware of this. He was the one who made the ominous remark: "I do not want some sergeant to start World War III."

Kennedy is no longer responsible for the actions of American sergeants and generals, but this remark acquires special meaning in view of all that is happening in the United States today.

Twenty years ago, when America was burying John Kennedy, another remark was made:

"A part of every one of us died at that moment. For even in death he gave a part of himself to every one of us.... He gave us the hope, every one of us, that there might be no more of the treachery, hatred, prejudice and violence that struck him down at that terrible moment.

"John Fitzgerald Kennedy, the President of the United States, is gone, but he left us these gifts.... Do we have enough common sense, responsibility and courage to accept them?"*

Did they have enough?

Of course, the world did not stand still even after Kennedy's assassination. The millstone of real politics ground and broke down much of the alluvia of the "cold war" era, as the history of international relations in recent decades testifies. The authors and co-authors of doctrines like the "containment of communism" have died, and so have their absurd and sinister doctrines. The reflection of the presidency of Kennedy, who at first brought the world situation to a dangerous brink (the Caribbean crisis and the Berlin crisis) and then realized the counterproductivity and futility of exacerbating Soviet-American relations, naturally colored the actions of subsequent U.S. presidents. Even hundreds of shots from hundreds of snipers' rifles cannot kill the idea of the historical necessity of peaceful coexistence by states with different social and political systems.

A recognition of the principle of parity in the nuclear arms of the opposed military organizations (Kennedy came to this in the end) was reflected in realistic thinking and subsequently led to a series of exceptionally important

* Senator Michael Mansfield's Eulogy for Kennedy, 24 November 1963.

agreements between the USSR and the United States, the USSR and the FRG, and the FRG and the GDR, PPR and CSSR. The 1970's strengthened the great hope that a prolonged peaceful coexistence of countries with different political and social systems was possible. The spirit of Helsinki and the spirit of detente refreshed the atmosphere literally over the whole globe. It is hardly likely that anyone with the slightest bit of common sense would not connect these comforting changes with the constant and comprehensive efforts of the Soviet State in the international arena.

Then why is the echo of those shots in Dallas still audible? Because when one recalls the times of John Kennedy and the positive steps America took even after his assassination, one recalls the statement by the 35th President of the United States: "I do not want some sergeant to start World War III."

We will focus mainly on the interview the President gave IZVESTIYA in 1961.* This very fact, the desire to address the Soviet public through our press, also expressed a remarkable feature of John F. Kennedy: his ability to sense new trends and to rectify errors he had committed, even if this detracted from his prestige from a human or political standpoint.

There is one more fact that might tell the reader why I have reread a 20-year-old newspaper.

The world today is genuinely seized with anxiety. It is no longer merely the winds, but the storms, of cold war which are blowing across the ocean from America. It is as if everything which was paid for so dearly and which demanded such colossal effort has been forgotten. It is as if those across the ocean have not experienced tragic errors and belated insight, such as after the failure of the adventure in the Bay of Pigs or the even more shameful Vietnam War, which dragged on for years. It is as if the sad experience of John Kennedy has been forgotten. It was precisely his administration that brought the 1962 Caribbean crisis to maximum tension, but then the President found enough strength and courage within himself to make the right decisions. At first he indulged the "hawks," but he also paid attention to realistic voices in America and the rest of the world and made the following response to the "hawks'" criticism: "Washington's military has one huge advantage. If we do what they want us to do, not one of us will be left alive to tell them afterwards that they were wrong."

Those who knew America in the days when the Caribbean crisis ended could not but notice an unusually emotional outburst of relief that spread throughout the country after the crisis had been resolved. Of course, we in our country also rejoiced over the wise agreement. We rejoiced over the fact that Cuba upheld its right to organize its own life according to its own judgment.

A quarter of a century of socialist Cuba and its indisputable successes prove the enormous creative force of a free people. Incidentally, the President's brother, Robert Kennedy, also spoke frankly about these "joys" and "sorrows" in connection with the resolution of the crisis. He said that the American generals gritted their teeth....

* IZVESTIYA, 28 November 1961.

Let us return, however, to an earlier period in John Kennedy's presidency. It seemed that almost immediately after his arrival in the White House, he decided to express his views on the world situation and on Soviet-American relations directly through a Soviet newspaper. It is difficult to judge the President's exact motives. Did he want to clear up some misunderstandings? Did he want more constructive dialogue and the relaxation of international tension? Or did he perhaps sense that the USSR's peaceful policy and active promotion of international dialogue were winning increasing support from the world public?

Whatever his motive may have been, on 22 November 1961, exactly 2 years before he was killed, the President received some journalists from IZVESTIYA. The meeting was originally scheduled for Washington, but the President's plans changed and the interview was held in Hyannis Port, a small town we could describe as a resort near Boston.

The weather in Boston was terrible. When the aircraft was about to land, the thought occurred to us that the pilots had made a mistake and were preparing to land the passengers of a regular airliner in the ocean as though they were flying a hydroplane.

After riding just over half an hour in a fast American car, we were in Hyannis Port. The landscape reminded us of the Baltic coastline. White sand dunes lined the shore of a faint green ocean. The ocean paused and then rolled its supple waves to the shore in a measured and majestic manner. The rain had retreated to the horizon, where lightning played soundlessly. The branches and tops of small pine trees were bent in such an artful manner that they seemed to have been pruned by an expert flower arranger. This had all been done by the wind.

The white houses of the Kennedy family's place in the country harked back to idyllic Victorian taste. The driveway of the President's home was blocked by a double line of police cars. Some of the cars were convertibles, some were sedans; some were colored and some were a somber black.... Young men in uniform, carrying all sorts of weapons, were clearly aware of the value and prestige of their mission. One whistled, spat out his chewing gum, hopped into one of the convertibles and pulled it over to the side, after which we drove up to a white picket fence and a gate, which was opened by another policeman. The faces of the 100-kilogram guards revealed not a trace of curiosity: They carried out their duties with sphinx-like faces. The police car returned to its previous spot, symbolically cutting off the path of retreat.

John Kennedy gave us a warm welcome in the living room. Gay cotton print curtains and chairs and sofas upholstered in matching fabric made the glass-walled room cheerful and inviting. The President leaned back in a high-backed rocking chair. His back, injured during the war, required support....

The day before we left for Boston, the President's brother, Robert Kennedy, received us in Washington. Looking now at the President, I was struck by the physical resemblance of the two men, and yet there were differences.

True, Robert Kennedy endorsed his brother's idea of giving the interview. "John and I," he emphasized, "agree on the need to find the best possible ways of developing contact with the Soviet Union. Too much hinges on the relationship between our two countries," he concluded.

Apropos of our meeting with his brother, Robert talked about his visit to the Soviet Union and about the fact that, long before him, before the war, John Kennedy had also visited our country....

While the preparations were being made for the actual interview and while the stenographer was laying out his notebooks, John Kennedy conducted polite conversation.

"I visited the Soviet Union back in 1939, when I was still quite a young man," he said. "Your country had only just started to make progress, but I, a mere student, could divine its future. Of course, I realize that many things have changed and that the standard of living is rising. People in our country have a better life now too."

The President told us that when he was fighting in the Pacific, far from Europe, as a naval officer, he followed the battle actions of the Soviet armies with great interest. And then, in a seemingly casual tone, he said: "That terrible war did not bypass our home either."

We knew that the eldest Kennedy brother had died tragically in the war. He and his companion were ordered to take off from a British airport aboard a Liberator plane and to set the plane on automatic pilot in the direction of one of the Fascist targets in Germany. The crew took off with a cargo of 11 tons of explosives aboard. The men on the ground waited for the fliers to parachute from the aircraft in good time as planned. For some reason, however, the "flying powder keg" exploded prematurely and the crew perished....

Anticipating our questions, the President said:

"I value this opportunity to speak with the people of the Soviet Union through this newspaper. I believe that this kind of contact, the exchange of opinions and the accurate elucidation of how our countries look, what they want and what our people want, are in the interest of our countries and in the interest of peace."

We journalists have a practice of "referring back to the printed word." After rereading the record of our more than 3 hours of conversation with President Kennedy, I would like to discuss two important matters he mentioned.

The first--it seemed to be an impasse at the time--concerned West Berlin and the traffic to and from this city through the territory of the GDR. Kennedy was pessimistic. His reasoning clearly reflected the pointed remarks and harsh tone of the politician who had campaigned under the banner of "cold war" inertia and had criticized his predecessor, D. Eisenhower, for failing to arm the country adequately. It is true that the President used ambiguous phrases even in this context. He declared: "When I assumed office, I found

Soviet-American relations in a worse state than I had expected." In this way, he seemed to be deflecting criticism of his own policy. Later, however, when he was asked about the possibility of real improvement in these relations, he spoke constructively: "Both small and big steps are important in this extremely complex process." Then he remarked, not without irony, that he had lifted the embargo on crabs from our country. "Of course, the crab war was only a minor one, but it is a pleasure to end even a war of this magnitude."

Kennedy blamed the entire "cold war" which had been started by Washington over the West Berlin issue on the unyielding attitude of the Soviet Union and did not appear to know of any realistic way of finding mutually acceptable solutions. But he was wrong: A few years later, the painstaking and complex negotiations resulted in a quadripartite agreement on West Berlin, but it was too late for Kennedy to see.

Although the President's approach to world events seemed novel at the time, many of his answers reflected the stereotypical beliefs of American leaders. This particularly applied to the second group of problems. Kennedy attributed all social movements in the world to "communist infiltration." When the question was put to him directly, he stipulated: "Of course, I do not believe, and I am not saying, that the Soviet Union is responsible for all changes in the world." It is obvious, however, that he did believe this.

In any case, his ideas about "freedom of choice" for people were based on a vague notion of "free elections." For instance, he agreed (though unwillingly, and this was noticeable) that everything had been done "according to the rules" in British Guiana, where the Marxist Jagan had been elected. But wherever people engaged in the armed defense of their right to freedom of choice, there was, according to Kennedy, something fishy going on. He kept his silence when he was asked how democratic the governments of the dictator Trujillo or the shah of Iran were.

The main factor influencing virtually all of his answers was, in a word, anxiety. Whether the conversation was about the abovementioned issues or about the prospects for actual USSR-U.S. negotiations, the President never seemed indifferent. Eventually his thinking was apparently influenced most by the constructive attitude he was then approaching.

It is neither necessary nor possible to recount the entire interview with the President. A few more quotations will probably convey the most essential aspects of this conversation.

"I think that the Soviet Union and the United States should live together in peace. Our countries are large and our people are energetic, and we are constantly securing a rise in the standard of living. If we can live in peace for 20 years, the lives of people in both the Soviet Union and the United States will be enriched considerably and will be much happier as the standard of living rises."

President Kennedy's most important and most cherished dream has come true in the years since that time. The earth has swung around the eternal orbit of

the sun not 20 times, but 22, since the time these sincere words were uttered: "If we can live in peace for 20 years...." Let us evaluate the late President's contribution to this fact of mankind's history, a fact of supreme importance. It was under the Kennedy Administration that an extremely important agreement (the first concerning nuclear issues) was concluded--the ban on nuclear tests in the three spheres. Difficult talks were also conducted on other matters.

It has already been pointed out that when Kennedy's actions stimulated a realistic approach to international relations, they also affected subsequent U.S. policy, and this naturally improved the entire world situation in the 1970's. It is true that the opportunistic creation of various problems by the United States continued to irritate the world public even in those years of great hopes and major positive solutions.

The sad truth is that bad premonitions usually come true. There is no getting away from the truth or from the fact that the 40th President of the United States is now pushing the world toward a nuclear catastrophe with maniacal persistence. Two decades after Kennedy's assassination, people in the United States are trying to revive, and with some success, the days of the 33d President, H. Truman, and are trying to go even further in the escalation of international tension.

Harry Truman could quote ancient philosophers from memory. Some regarded him as a good orator until he and his associates plunged the world into a "cold war."

A few more statements from the memorable interview with J. Kennedy would probably be apt in this connection:

"I think it would be a good thing if the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries could pledge to live in peace with one another.... I think that if relations between our countries can be normalized, both sides will be less inclined to build up their military strength...."

"Then I would evaluate the strength of the United States and of the Soviet Union and I would say how important it is to prevent a war from annihilating both our systems...."

"The Soviet Union is a strong military power. It possesses great nuclear strength.... No one will ever invade the Soviet Union again. There is no military force capable of this. The important thing now is to conclude an agreement which will ensure the recognition of our interests as well as yours, and there is no question that we are capable of doing this."

"The real danger today is that both you and we have weapons in our nuclear arsenals which can inflict colossal destruction on the other side, and we will be the ones who suffer the most from a war. No one can gain as much from peace as the Soviet Union and the United States."

I admit that any "Sovietologist" who rummages through archives could find the text of this interview and notice that the author is quoting President

Kennedy selectively, omitting other statements. We will stand on our copyright and on our respect for the memory of the dead President. Unfortunately, he cannot arbitrate this discussion.

There is a well-known expression that "authority comes with maturity." This phrase applies not only to mere mortals, but also to politicians. Those who study "personality politics" know of many cases of this kind of positive maturation. Kennedy was one of those who managed to do this. The Kennedy presidency, especially during the last stage preceding the fatal event, contained, in spite of the flaws and failures discussed previously, the beginning of a new approach to world events, and primarily to Soviet-American relations.

In June 1963 President Kennedy delivered his famous speech at the American University (Washington). By this time he had been managing the affairs of a great country for quite a while. President Kennedy appealed to the young in this speech. He asked for their help and support. He promised them that he would build an America that would strengthen the world instead of intimidating it, and on equal terms with other nations.

In this respect, the President's speech--according to close sources, he spent a great deal of time preparing it--was well-balanced, objective and sincere. The President called upon his audience to look at the Soviet Union and at the "cold war" in a new way and to understand that we all live on the same small planet, breathe the same air and are concerned about the future of our children...and that we are all mortal. He called upon his listeners--not only in the lecture hall, but everywhere in the world--to also understand this simple fact: Universal peace does not require every man to love his neighbor.... It requires only that people live in mutual tolerance, submitting disagreements for discussion so that they can be resolved in a just and peaceful way.

The world public listened to President Kennedy's speech with hope. In the United States, however, it inspired rage in not merely "some people" or "a few others," but precisely in those who had asserted and spread opposing political views for decades.

It is possible that all the preparations for the assassination had already been made at that time. Perhaps the possible routes of the funeral cortege had already been studied and the rifle, the bullets and the "fairgrounds sniper," to whom pulling the trigger meant nothing, had already been chosen.

When the time allotted for the interview was up, the President suggested a walk on the beach. In the entrance hall he distributed warm jackets to our team of journalists: "The north wind here chills you to the bone." He wore only a light jacket, explaining: "A naval officer has to meet certain standards."

The wind was getting stronger. It drove the waves with great force. The ocean grew choppy and multicolored. It was nearly black on the horizon, but closer to shore green waves and white caps riding on the crests of waves created the impression of boiling water.

Kennedy was quiet, admiring--as we were--the fanciful play of the natural elements. Then he made a few remarks which were not incorporated in the interview but which I wrote down as soon as I had returned to the hotel. He said: "When they had conquered Fascism, the great leaders of the great coalition realized that the world would become even more confused and complex. They lacked the strength, and perhaps even the time, to begin the hellish job of making it better. Coming generations will not be able to forgive us for that."

It is difficult to predict future developments in the United States. One thing, however, is clear: The powerful forces directing the development of American politics are pushing events along the well-worn track of anti-Sovietism with iron consistency. At the moment, they are succeeding in nullifying the efforts of statesmen who prefer other alternatives in the development of relations between our countries. Recent years have proved this with absolute authenticity. But the world is changing, and so is America.

When will the United States have another President who will realize this as fully as John Fitzgerald Kennedy was beginning, in my opinion, to realize it?

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CSO: 1803/5

'REAL MOTIVES' OF U.S. MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS IN EUROPE EXAMINED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 84 (signed to press 21 Dec 83) pp 63-69

[Article by V. S. Shein: "False Pretexts and Real Motives"]

[Text] Paying no attention to the clearly expressed wishes of their own people and the serious warnings of the Soviet leadership, the governments of the United States and its Western allies have taken a stand hostile to the cause of peace by commencing the deployment of new American nuclear missiles on the European continent with a range guaranteeing the destruction of targets on Soviet territory.

A NATO document adopted on this matter 4 years ago at a special session of the bloc council contained the unfounded allegation that the USSR had already surpassed the West in terms of medium-range nuclear weapons for several years by that time and was constantly reinforcing this superiority in the quantitative and qualitative sense. It also alleged that NATO potential in this area had remained unchanged and that this state of affairs, in combination with the Soviet "superiority," cast doubts upon the reliability of the NATO doctrine of "flexible response" by emphasizing the existence of a "gap" in the range of bloc nuclear armaments.

When the Western powers pointed out the "need for specific steps" to maintain the reliability of NATO military strategy--that is, to build up nuclear potential--in December 1979, they also declared that they attached "great significance" to arms control as a means of securing stable military relations between East and West and promoting the process of detente. In this context, the "contribution of the SALT II treaty" was applauded and the importance of extending these efforts to Soviet and American medium-range systems was underscored. Furthermore, according to the insolent logic of the NATO communique, the "double decision" was practically a concession to the Soviet Union.

Anyone who now reads the text of this document, which is "unique" in so many respects, will be amazed by the highly hypocritical and propagandistic nature of all the statements not referring directly to the "nuclear rearmament" of NATO. It is actually a record of an overt attempt to confuse the Western public by promising it "stronger security," "successful arms limitation talks with the USSR" and "the further development of detente."

Not one of these promises was carried out. In fact, international relations were severely strained and the danger of a nuclear conflict was considerably augmented. Washington used the Soviet-American talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe only as a cover for its preparations for the actual deployment of new medium-range missiles on the European continent. This gives rise to a legitimate question: What was the reason for the NATO leaders' obvious "miscalculation" in their assessment of future prospects, for this glaring contradiction between their promises and today's realities? Was this merely a case of political nearsightedness or did the Western leaders deliberately deceive their own people?

The entire history of the medium-range missiles is filled with elements of misrepresentation and deceit. For example, the main official motive for the "double decision" was the need to have a "counterbalance" to the Soviet SS-20 missiles. In recent years a great deal of valid evidence has come to light in the West to refute the argument put forth 4 years ago, that these missiles were the specific reason for NATO's "nuclear rearmament" efforts. This explanation was appealing to NATO politicians primarily for two reasons. First of all, the 1979 decision was presented to the public as the West's response to a situation allegedly caused by the Soviet Union. Secondly, it was suggested to this same public that the actual deployment of the new American systems in Western Europe might never take place if the USSR should agree to dismantle its SS-20 missiles. In this way, all of the blame for the current situation, for NATO's "double decision" and for future developments, including the actual move toward a "buildup," was transferred to the Soviet Union from the very beginning.

The concern about the effects of Soviet-American strategic parity on the security of Western Europe was equally false. It is indicative that this "concern" (just as the concern about the SS-20 missiles) was originally expressed almost exclusively by American experts, and it was only later that this form of speculation spread to Western Europe. The most famous statements in this connection were those by then Chancellor H. Schmidt of the FRG, who said that the SALT process had established the existence of Soviet-U.S. parity and had thereby revealed a "discrepancy" between Eastern and Western tactical nuclear and conventional weapons. In this manner, the question of parity and the question of the SS-20 missile were used as a convenient pretext in the political campaign to prepare the public for the "double decision" and then to justify it.

The speculation over the so-called problem of the reliability of NATO military doctrine, envisaging the extension of U.S. strategic nuclear "guarantees" to Western Europe, was intended to prove that Washington could not carry out its ally obligations without the "nuclear rearmament" of the North Atlantic bloc. It was stressed that the new systems, by creating the threat of nuclear strikes against Soviet targets directly from the West European countries, would provide an additional "detering factor" and thereby reinforce the strategy of "flexible response." In accordance with the logic of this approach, medium-range missiles were needed by NATO members in any case, regardless of whether the Soviet Union would have its SS-20 missiles or not.

The West's allegations that the "double decision" was a "response" helped to pave the way for the declaration of the NATO countries' determination to secure a nuclear balance "acceptable" to them in the European theater through arms control talks. In reality, however, the "disarmament" element was always regarded as a tactical ruse designed to interest people and parliaments in "nuclear rearmament," particularly in those states where the new American missiles were to be deployed. As for the talks themselves, according to the official NATO position, they could only "supplement, and not replace the modernization of nuclear forces." This was precisely the line to which the American delegation in Geneva adhered so tenaciously, displaying a reluctance to come to any agreements on ways of curbing the nuclear arms race in Europe.

It is obvious that these elements of the position of the United States and other NATO countries reflect these countries' tactics in the area of "nuclear rearmament," but not the real purpose of their approach. The real motives of Washington and its main NATO allies were completely different. In the case of the present American administration, they fit perfectly into the context of its militarist line which is posing a serious threat to peace. "In essence," Yu. V. Andropov stressed, "it is an attempt to secure the dominant position in the world for the United States without considering the interests of other states and peoples." American ruling circles have assigned an important role to the escalation of the nuclear arms race and the involvement of West European allies in this race.

It must be said that the foundations for this policy were already being laid 10 or 15 years ago. At the beginning of the 1970's the American leadership conducted a general review of NATO nuclear potential in Europe with a view to the objectives of the doctrine of "flexible response." According to the Pentagon, this potential was designed for "deterrence" and "defense" on the European continent, including the "deterrence" of conflict escalation, and could be used in military actions involving conventional weapons.

NATO politicians tried to prove the need for the "improvement" of their nuclear forces in Western Europe by making references to an alleged buildup of Warsaw Pact non-nuclear weapons. According to then U.S. Secretary of Defense J. Schlesinger, these NATO forces constituted the "main symbol of the serious American commitment to the common defense of the North Atlantic alliance." As people in Washington are now more likely to admit, however, the systems with which NATO armed itself during the period when the doctrine of "massive retaliation" was in effect, did not secure the reliable performance of new strategic functions. Systems for the delivery of nuclear weapons and the weapons themselves were called obsolete.

According to the American leadership's spokesmen, the structure and technical properties of the nuclear weapons deployed in West European countries would not allow for their use in combat in accordance with the provisions of the doctrine of "flexible response," including the delivery of strikes against Warsaw Pact troops on the frontline and in subsequent echelons and the destruction of tank units, missile launchers, artillery batteries and tactical support aircraft.

In the first half of the past decade there were widespread debates in the West on the optimal dimensions of NATO nuclear potential and various parameters of this potential. A few "minimalists" insisted that several hundred projectiles were sufficient for a military theater. Other points of view were also expressed:

More substantial forces were needed to secure "balanced escalation" potential, to counterbalance any enemy escalation of the use of nuclear weapons, which would theoretically make it impossible for the Soviet Union to gain any advantages in a conflict after America had used nuclear weapons first;

The threat to use nuclear weapons first can be reliable only if the West is capable of total "domination in escalation," presupposing NATO's ability to escalate a conflict arbitrarily and thereby absolutely outbalance the USSR.

Supporters of the dramatic escalation of the arms race, including nuclear arms, turned out to have the greatest influence. The United States and its allies began to restore NATO's military superiority to the socialist states. The nuclear rearming of the North Atlantic bloc was one of the methods specifically chosen for the attainment of this goal. It was alleged that the reliability of "flexible response" could not be secured without this move, especially its cardinal premise of the first use of nuclear weapons. As people in the West frequently stressed, acting on this premise with the means at NATO's disposal would not lead to a victory over the USSR and could even evoke a decisive retaliatory strike from the Soviet side. In a situation like this, a report prepared by the Carnegie Foundation noted, for example, Washington would have to choose between using strategic systems or taking no further action whatsoever. According to the prevailing opinion in the NATO countries, the existence of strategic parity and the alleged vulnerability of American ICBM's would force the U.S. leadership to choose the second alternative and thereby ignore its "flexible response" commitments.

In the middle of the 1970's these "arguments" began to be put forth actively by people striving for the substantial reinforcement of the NATO nuclear arsenal with weapons free of the "shortcomings" that might preclude the actual use of nuclear weapons against the Warsaw Pact states. Specific "shortcomings" which supposedly undermined the effectiveness of Western potential were specified:

First of all, there was the "inadequate" range of nuclear forces, only part of which could be used to deliver strikes against many targets in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and targets directly on Soviet territory (the leaders of the NATO countries alleged that the West's capabilities were "too limited" in this respect);

Secondly, there was the "vulnerability" of nuclear weapons. Just as in the case of the so-called vulnerability of American ICBM's, this obviously spurious argument is based on the speculative use of the "Soviet military threat." According to Western experts, long-range delivery systems--that is, most of NATO's aircraft--were the most lacking in the necessary survivability. It is indicative that overcoming enemy air defense was considered to be a more important issue than the pre-launch "vulnerability" of nuclear forces.

Western experts have been virtually unanimous in their view that another "weakness" of NATO's nuclear potential in Europe is "the absence of an integral battle doctrine," which would define the functions of medium-range nuclear forces in the event that a conflict should escalate beyond the use of conventional weapons. In particular, they have noted that the NATO military leadership has concentrated exclusively on requirements pertaining to the first use of nuclear weapons, as if sufficient attention has not been paid to the planning of effective combat operations.

All of this indicates that those who advocate the elimination of the "short-comings" of NATO's nuclear potential are motivated primarily by a desire to make this bloc superior to the Warsaw Pact not only by means of the quantitative buildup of these forces,* but also and primarily by means of the incorporation of qualitatively new systems. These systems are needed by the NATO countries so that they can have the "reliable" capability to deliver strikes against targets far inside the boundaries of the USSR and other socialist states by correcting the "inadequate" range of theater nuclear forces, to use theater nuclear weapons against targets in the Warsaw Pact countries "effectively" by reducing the vulnerability of these weapons to enemy air defense systems, and to deliver "countervalue" and "counterforce" strikes against socialist targets from the European theater by reducing the "excessive force" of some of the nuclear armaments designed for this purpose and heightening the accuracy of delivery systems.

The appeals for these kinds of "improvements" today have many features in common with similar appeals made in the first half of the 1970's. It was then that U.S. ruling circles resolved to determine the optimal dimensions and improve the structure of theater nuclear forces, specifically for their more effective use in a conflict involving a combination of conventional and nuclear weapons. At the same time, they stressed the need to improve control and communication systems, determine ways of limiting the losses accompanying the use of nuclear weapons and heighten the safety of these weapons in the absence of a conflict.

It is evident that the actual use of these weapons in combat was already the major U.S. concern with regard to the development of NATO's nuclear potential in Western Europe under the Nixon and Ford administrations. People in Washington were saying at that time, just as they are today, that the ability to use these weapons was the best way of "detering the enemy." For this reason, arguments in favor of the compilation and implementation of various nuclear programs were put forth for many years.

It was actually at the beginning of the last decade that the practical guidelines of all subsequent programs for the buildup of NATO nuclear potential

* NATO members are even prepared to reduce their nuclear stockpiles to some degree by getting rid of obsolete systems, as they did in 1980, when a thousand such warheads were removed from Western Europe as part of the propaganda surrounding the "double decision"; incidentally, this operation was also motivated in part by the possibility of obtaining extremely scarce nuclear raw material for the production of better warheads.

were chosen. They were specified, in particular, in speeches by U.S. Secretary of Defense J. Schlesinger, who repeatedly stressed that the North Atlantic bloc should possess enough nuclear potential in Europe to secure the possibility of using these weapons in a variety of ways, including the destruction of military targets in troop dispositions and far within enemy territory. American strategists insisted on the urgency of such moves as the determination of "selective" or "control" scenarios of the use of theater nuclear forces in combat.

In this way, the general position on the development of nuclear potential in Western Europe and the means of securing its actual use in combat had been defined by the middle of the 1970's in the United States. Many elements of this position still exist in their entirety today and have determined the content of a key aspect of American policy in NATO, the workings of Washington relations with the West European allies, for around 10 years now.

It must be said that the determination of America's own approach by the U.S. leadership was accompanied by the pressuring of its "junior partners." These matters were discussed regularly during bilateral contacts on various levels and in NATO's administrative military bodies, and consultations regarding ways of heightening the effectiveness of nuclear forces in the European theater and updating theories about the procedure and nature of their use for the purpose of "deterrence" and "defense" began to be held in the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in 1974. At meetings of the NPG the defense ministers of the Western powers analyzed the role of theater nuclear forces and acknowledged the need to heighten the effectiveness of these forces. Furthermore, they stressed the importance of "broad participation by the allies in the development of the NATO nuclear plans and nuclear defense system."

In general, even before the start of the Carter Administration the American leadership had been able to convince its "junior partners" to accept certain proposals regarding the nuclear rearmament of the North Atlantic bloc in principle. These were the proposals on the replacement of the surface-to-surface Honest John and Sergeant missiles with the new Lance missiles which were distinguished by higher accuracy and, as it later became known, were adaptable to neutron warheads; on the use of the Pershing II instead of the Pershing I missile (apparently, plans to increase the range of new missiles existed even then); on the replacement of combat alert planes with submarine-based missiles; on the use of highly accurate cruise missiles with various basing methods and with nuclear and non-nuclear warheads. These proposals were made in December 1975 by U.S. Secretary of Defense D. Rumsfeld, and 6 months later they were essentially approved at a regular session of the NATO NPG.

In a report to Congress on the next military budget just before President Carter's arrival in the White House, D. Rumsfeld quite frankly discussed Washington's views on the nuclear forces in Western Europe. Noting that the assigned functions of these forces would have a decisive effect on their dimensions and composition, Rumsfeld stressed that American nuclear potential in the European theater was geared to the destruction of military targets and that the United States made plans for the development of these forces with a view to their combat function.

Specifically, according to Rumsfeld's explanations, the European theater nuclear weapons were intended for selective, "limited" strikes against important permanent military targets--for the destruction of enemy offensive forces on the regional level and for strikes against air defense systems, missile launchers, communication lines and troop concentrations on the front-line and in the rear on the theater level.

Rumsfeld called the emphasis on the combat use of theater nuclear weapons the only correct point of departure, stressing that the United States must insist on alternative means of their "selective" use. He refuted the arguments of those who questioned the feasibility of these alternatives on the pretext that the effects of a conflict in a theater would be unpredictable. He also refuted proposals envisaging the reduction of U.S. nuclear forces outside national boundaries and the cessation of the production of any new types of nuclear weapons intended for the European theater of war.

The Democratic administration succeeding that of G. Ford continued its predecessor's efforts and even intensified the planning and implementation of related measures in NATO. By May 1977, or just 3 months after the start of the new administration, the U.S. leadership submitted a draft long-range military program to its allies, one point of which envisaged the "modernization" of tactical nuclear weapons. The program in its final form was adopted a year later. As for its statements about nuclear "modernization," one of these became the NATO "double decision," actually sanctioning Washington's reckless line of the "limited" use of nuclear weapons in Europe.

It must be said that when the Carter Administration launched the program to "rearm" NATO with new American medium-range systems, it was working with a ready-made plan, and this was probably the main reason for its efficiency. When the SS-20 missiles suddenly became the object of "Western concern," the technology of cruise missiles and medium-range Pershing II ballistic missiles was being developed to the maximum. Furthermore, as the Western press reported in 1976, the U.S. Air Force had already investigated the possibility of deploying land-based cruise missiles in Great Britain, and one of the passionate advocates of "rearmament," R. Burt, who was then the assistant director of the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, praised the "unlimited possibilities" of these missiles for NATO's purposes in the first issue of SURVIVAL magazine that same year. Particularly loud publicity was given to such properties of the new systems as their ability to overcome Soviet ABM systems and to destroy a wide range of targets with a high level of accuracy, including "rush" targets in the case of the Pershing II with its flight time of 6-12 minutes.

It is indicative that many members of the Reagan Administration have expressed dissatisfaction with the NATO "double decision." But this has been the dissatisfaction of "hawks" who have complained that the projected volumes of medium-range missile deployment will not provide an "adequate response" and that the "nuclear rearmament" program is focused only on one element of the entire range of theater nuclear weapons and thereby diverts attention from the "real problem" facing NATO in connection with the "Soviet threat" and demanding the buildup of all types of Western nuclear weapons. The supporters

of this line stress that the projected deployment of American missiles in Western Europe should be regarded as the beginning of the complete renovation of NATO nuclear forces.

During the course of this process and on the basis of already accomplished elements of "rearmament," American militarists are seeking a substantial increase in the number of medium-range systems in the West European countries and hope to transfer other types of nuclear weapons to Europe. They have persistently tried to prove the urgent need for a thorough revision of NATO nuclear strategy for the purpose of coming up with a doctrine based on new nuclear potential used in real combat situations. They have suggested that the deployment of land-based systems be supplemented with the appropriate steps in the area of airborne and naval nuclear weapons intended for the European theater.

The current U.S. administration has made overt attempts to disrupt the existing balance of medium-range nuclear weapons in the European zone to NATO's advantage and has simultaneously regarded its own allies as hostages, adhering firmly to the plans for "nuclear rearmament." It obviously supports--in actions as well as in words--the adventuristic ideas about "limited nuclear war" in Europe and the restoration of military superiority to the USSR. This line is an exceptionally dangerous one in international affairs.

"The appearance of the American Pershings and cruise missiles on the European continent is becoming a fact," a statement of 24 November 1983 by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Yu. V. Andropov said. "The nuclear missiles deployed near the boundaries of the Soviet Union and its allies are certainly not for the defense of Western Europe--it is not being threatened by anyone. The deployment of American missiles in Europe will increase not Europe's security, but the real danger that the United States will plunge the people of Europe into a catastrophe."

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U.S., CHINESE APPROACHES TO BILATERAL RELATIONS CONTRASTED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 84 (signed to press 21 Dec 83) pp 70-76

[Article by V. P. Lukin: "The United States and the PRC: A New Round of Visits"]

[Text] Autumn 1983 was an active period in American-Chinese relations. C. Weinberger, U.S. secretary of defense, was in the PRC on an official visit from 25-29 September, and Wu Xueqian, PRC minister of foreign affairs, arrived in the United States on 10 October for a 4-day visit. This intensity of contacts at a high government level has attracted the attention of many observers.

Both the visit itself of the American secretary of defense to the PRC and its timing could not help but attract great attention in the world. It took place in a period when Washington was making energetic efforts to heat up the international situation as much as possible, and to bring the anti-Soviet propaganda campaign to as high a pitch as possible. It is difficult to rid oneself of the impression that one of the most important aims of the Pentagon leader's visit was to contribute his bit to these efforts of the Reagan administration.

Briefly, the following is known about the external aspects of the visit: On his arrival in Beijing, C. Weinberger conducted intensive negotiations with Zhang Aiping, PRC minister of national defense, and met with Zhao Ziyang, premier of the PRC State Council, and with Deng Xiaoping, chairman of the CCP Central Advisory Commission. At the end of the negotiations, he set off for Xian, the ancient capital of China, where he visited an aircraft engine production plant (these engines are manufactured under the license of the English Rolls Royce firm). Then he went to Shanghai with the aim of visiting the ships and commanders of the PRC naval forces. At the end of the visit, it was officially announced that an agreement had been reached on a visit by Premier Zhao Ziyang to the United States in January 1984 and a visit by President R. Reagan to the PRC in April.

However, the Chinese Government has voiced a sharp protest in connection with the resolution adopted at the beginning of November by the American Congress, which concerns the "future of Taiwan," emphasizing that this act flouts the sovereignty of China and is aimed at implementing intervention in the country's

internal affairs. At a press conference in Tokyo on 26 November, Hu Yaobang announced that "the visit of Premier of the PRC State Council Zhao Ziyang to Washington, planned for January, could be cancelled depending on the U.S. approach to the Taiwan problem."

As far as the results of the visit are concerned, the situation is far less certain. A great deal was written in the American press on the eve of the visit about how Weinberger was intending to exert pressure on the Chinese side so as to significantly broaden cooperation between the two countries in the military sphere. When the negotiations were concluded, nothing was said about any official agreement or understanding regarding supplies of American military equipment and technology to the PRC. Commenting on this, the WASHINGTON POST made the following assessment: "Agreeing to receive military equipment from the United States is a very ticklish problem for the Chinese, and one must assume that this is because the Chinese fear lest those American officials who place relations with Taiwan in the foreground use this for the purpose of carrying out further deliveries of military equipment and technology to Taiwan. Although the Chinese also expressed an earlier interest in concluding a military agreement with the Carter administration, they nevertheless turned down the proposal of Secretary of State Alexander Haig when he arrived in Beijing in June 1981 with an offer of supplies of American military technical equipment. The secretary of defense, Caspar Weinberger, also received a similar reply when he returned to this question during the course of his negotiations in Beijing last week. Zhao Ziyang announced that for a country as large as China, it was 'unthinkable to implement military modernization by means of purchasing military equipment from foreign powers.'"

This commentary does not, however, exhaust the entire mosaic of responses to the American secretary of defense's visit to the PRC. In particular, there is no mention in it of the fact that during the course of the visit an informal agreement was reached on continued contacts between the military departments of both countries on various levels right up to the very highest (the possibility has not been excluded, for example, of a return visit by Zhang Aiping to the United States in the near future). It was also reported that the Chinese side allegedly presented the American delegation with a list of military equipment (in place of the old list which was presented back in 1981) they would like to purchase. Washington insists that contracts should first be concluded for certain types of military and paramilitary materials, and then these contracts should be considered by American departments from the standpoint of how they correspond to "the interests of U.S. security." As American commentators confirm, this procedure is considered to be unacceptable by the Chinese side.

Because only the future development of events will shed light on the degree of trustworthiness of the abovementioned commentaries, it is difficult at present to answer the question as to how successful Weinberger's visit was from the standpoint of White House aims. Naturally, the American secretary himself described his visit to China as very successful, referring in this connection to the agreement reached on an exchange of visits at the highest level in the beginning of 1984. However, it is well known that the preliminary agreement on this exchange had already been reached long before the Pentagon chief went to Beijing.

As far as the protocol aspect of the visit of Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wu Xueqian to the United States is concerned, it was made up of meetings and talks (which representatives of the American administration called "constructive, useful and prolonged") with President R. Reagan, Vice-President G. Bush and Secretary of State G. Shultz. In addition to this, the Chinese guest met and talked with Weinberger, his deputy, P. Thayer, and also with Secretary of the Treasury D. Regan, Secretary of Commerce M. Baldrige and other highly placed officials. The American UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL agency, referring to "official Chinese sources," reported that Wu Xueqian had an unannounced meeting with CIA Director W. Casey. Furthermore, the PRC minister of foreign affairs visited Chicago, participating in a ceremony to mark the opening of a PRC consulate there.

The present intensification of American-Chinese contacts at a high level cannot be regarded as something essentially new in their relations. The intense activation of relations between the two countries during the last years of President J. Carter's administration, culminating in the establishment of official diplomatic relations in 1979 and the conclusion of a series of agreements on the most diverse political, economic, scientific, technical and cultural problems, is well known.* After the start of the Reagan administration, the PRC was visited by, among many other delegations, then Secretary of State A. Haig (June 1981), Secretary of Commerce M. Baldrige and the President's science and technology adviser G. Keyworth (May 1983). Negotiations were held in Washington in November 1982 between Huang Hua, the PRC minister of foreign affairs at that time, and Bush, Shultz and Reagan. In December of the same year, Wang Bingqian, PRC minister of finance, visited the United States.

Of course, political consultations at a high level represent only the top of the pyramid of relations between two such major states as the United States and the PRC. The foundation of this pyramid has continued to gradually gain strength during the first years of the present decade. In 1982 the volume of trade between the two countries reached 5.2 billion dollars. PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Wu Xueqian noted at the reception held in Chicago on the occasion of his visit that from 1979 to 1982 the total volume of American-Chinese trade was 18.2 billion dollars, and that it was increasing at an average of 63 percent per year. As a result, the United States has become China's third largest trade partner (after Japan and Hong Kong), and at present 13.6 percent of PRC foreign trade goes to the United States. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, the two countries have signed protocols and concluded contracts which concern over 20 special spheres of science and technology.

At present, a number of large-scale cooperation programs between the PRC and many American corporations are being implemented. Thus, a protocol was signed in August last year between the PRC and some American oil companies (Exxon and Occidental Petroleum, in particular) concerning oil exploration in the South China Sea. Representative offices of 80 American companies and banks have opened in the PRC.

The second 5-year American-Chinese textile agreement was signed in Beijing in August 1983 after very long and complicated negotiations, permitting the

* B. N. Zanegin, "The Democratic Administration and the Diplomatic Recognition of the PRC," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1979, No 3.

Chinese side to annually increase the sale of its textiles in the United States by an average of 3.5 percent. This amounts to approximately half of the quota stipulated by the previous agreement, which expired in December 1982. However, this figure greatly exceeds the 1-percent increase originally proposed by the Reagan administration and gives the PRC an advantage in comparison with the main exporters of this category of goods--Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea, which are permitted to increase the export of their textile products to the United States by less than 1 percent annually.

In June 1983 President Reagan permitted American firms to sell the PRC computers and other so-called "dual purpose" technical equipment (it can be used for both peaceful and military purposes). Immediately after the adoption of this decision, C. Weinberger's September visit to the PRC was announced. Incidentally, it was precisely Weinberger who, during the course of heated debates within the administration over the course of more than 2 years, opposed, along with other ultra-conservative figures, supplies of this kind on the grounds that the PRC is a "communist state" and therefore an ideological enemy of the United States.

Thus, the exchange of visits last autumn merely emphasized those aspects of relations between the two countries which were more or less constant during the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's.

In addition, it appears that these visits are an attempt to end the period of fundamental friction and rough times which occurred in relations between the two countries soon after the Republican administration's assumption of power in the United States in January 1981, and which became quite substantial and acute between 1981 and spring 1983.

Just as during previous stages of the exacerbation of American-Chinese relations, the Taiwan problem is again the main specific conflict. It is well known that many influential members of the current administration, including the head of the White House, are openly disposed in favor of Taiwan. Dividing the world into "ours" and "theirs" and into the "bad reds" and the "good guys of the stars-and-stripes" is characteristic of their rigidly ideological outlook on the world. It is precisely these ideological boundaries that must eventually, in the opinion of these people, determine political and strategic boundaries. From the standpoint of this extremely simplistic approach to world realities, the Kuomintang regime in Taiwan is classed as "ours" and that is why it has been entitled to guardianship and military protection under all circumstances. A similar approach was expressed in more practical political language in the contradiction between the practices of the Carter administration, on the one hand, and the Act on Relations with Taiwan, which was adopted by Congress in 1979, on the other.

If the actions of the Carter administration were criticized for causing damage to the interests of Taiwan as a friend and ally of the United States, then the Act on Relations with Taiwan, which, apart from anything else, contained statements about the necessity of maintaining Taiwan's military resources at a level necessary for its existence separate from the rest of China, was extolled in every way and defined as the basis for mutual relations with that

island. The Reagan administration thereby de facto based its policy upon the principle of "One China--One Taiwan," which, as everyone knows, represents only a slightly camouflaged variation on the old concept of "two Chinas," which was decisively rejected by the Chinese people.

While implementing this policy quite consistently and stubbornly, the current American administration has undertaken a series of measures to strengthen the Taiwan regime militarily. Naturally, this has aroused very strong reactions on the part of the PRC leadership. Protracted negotiations led to the signing on 17 August 1982 of a joint American-Chinese communique. In it the United States confirmed that it considers the PRC Government to be the only legal representative of China, pledged not to increase aid to the Taiwan regime in comparison to what it was given at the beginning of the 1980's (700-800 million dollars a year) and promised to gradually reduce the level of military aid "as the situation in this region improves." In this respect, it declared that it was proceeding from the assumption that the PRC would not try to reunify China by non-peaceful means, and interpreted the communique as if it had received a corresponding commitment from the PRC on this account. The Chinese leadership energetically disputed this interpretation of the communique, emphasizing that it considered the Taiwan problem to be an internal affair of China.

The Taiwan problem in general and its treatment by the Reagan Administration in particular continue to be a source of tension in American-Chinese relations. Wu Xueqian stated while he was in Chicago: "The United States insists upon selling large quantities of arms to Taiwan. This is not only an encroachment upon our sovereignty and interference in our internal affairs, but also the actual encouragement of the Taiwan authorities to refuse to join us in our efforts to peacefully unite the homeland by means of negotiation. Naturally, we resolutely oppose this."

The inconsistent and two-faced U.S. policy in the sphere of economic cooperation has been a serious source of friction and differences in recent years. On the one hand, Washington has continued to declare loudly that the existence of a strong and flourishing China is in the interests of the United States, and that it therefore should offer every assistance in the PRC leadership's declared program of the "four modernizations." On the other hand, however, American ruling circles have completely subordinated the nature, forms and scale of cooperation with the economic, scientific and technical spheres to their own egotistical class interests. Hence the constant fluctuations and maneuvers with respect to what should and should not be given to China, and what economic and political price China must pay for American "good deeds." The position taken on these matters is constantly changing in accordance with the very unstable situation at the top of the U.S. political pyramid. Shultz' views do not coincide with those of Haig, Weinberger does not say what Secretary of Commerce M. Baldrige says, and so on and so forth. All of this makes the prospects of further development unclear, and the agreements already concluded are precarious, are subject to the most contradictory interpretations and cannot help but arouse caution on the Chinese side.

One can turn to the textile problem as an example. For the PRC, the export of textile products at a time of increasing domestic demand for oil to satisfy

the needs of the growing Chinese economy is one of the main sources of foreign exchange income in the near future and, consequently, a source of expanded imports of modern technology. Meanwhile, at the end of 1982, Washington broke off negotiations and introduced unilateral sanctions against the PRC when the Chinese side did not meet U.S. demands for a unilateral and sharp reduction of its exports to the American market. At that time, all of Washington's strategic and other "global" calculations were blocked by the textile lobby of the southern U.S. states and their ultra-conservative representatives in the American Congress (including the well-known and influential Senators J. Helms from North Carolina and S. Thurmond from South Carolina).

The PRC responded to this action by sharply reducing purchases of agricultural products from the United States: from 950,8 million dollars in the first 6 months of 1982 to 347.1 million in the first 6 months of 1983. This swift reduction played a role in the appearance of a U.S. trade deficit with the PRC of 33.1 million dollars during the first 6 months of 1983 (in comparison to an active balance of 662.7 million during the same period of the previous year).

But this circumstance has had a particularly perceptible effect on the position of American agriculture. According to some estimates it has incurred losses of 550 million dollars. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the PRC completely stopped concluding contracts for the purchase of American grain at the beginning of February 1983. This stimulated a heated struggle in American ruling circles between the textile and agriculture lobbies. As is well known, the latter has very effective levers of influence in Washington (one of its active representatives is the influential senator from Kansas, Republican R. Dole). Votes in agricultural areas are considered to be exceptionally important in White House election computations. In the end, the agricultural lobby prevailed over the textile lobby, which also led to the conclusion of a compromise agreement for the export of textiles to the United States (an expansion of the export of Chinese textiles was stipulated on the condition that the PRC increase its purchases of agricultural products, especially grain, from the United States). The circumstances which led to the conclusion of this agreement point up the egotistical nature of the attitudes of U.S. ruling circles toward the PRC, this nature being dictated by immediate mercenary calculations and hidden behind loud statements of friendship and cooperation. It is also obvious that agreements concluded on such an unstable and changeable domestic political basis cannot be reliable and effective.

Cultural contacts between the two countries have become a serious source of friction and differences. China is now adopting more decisive measures than it did 2 or 3 years ago against the penetration of Chinese society and the minds of Chinese young people by the negative aspects of the American "way of life." This irritates the American groups that were striving to "Americanize China" and gradually accustom it to the system of "American values."

In a broader context, one can speak of the evolution of American-Chinese relations being influenced to a certain extent by the policy formulated with regard to the United States at the 12th CCP Congress in September 1982. In a

report to the congress, American-Chinese relations were called "beneficial not only for the people of both countries but also for the rest of the world." Furthermore, the "independence and self-reliance" of PRC foreign policy were emphasized at the 12th CCP Congress and, after a short interval, the appeal to "struggle against the two superpowers" was again made. This was taken by many observers as an attempt to dissociate oneself to some degree from the capitalist states and to demonstrate the "equidistance" of the PRC from both the USSR and the United States.

The line of the 12th CCP Congress and certain foreign policy actions of the PRC Government, interpreted by observers as attempts to implement this line, have made American ruling circles understandably nervous. The main principle that the Reagan administration proceeded from in its approach to the PRC was the idea that the United States is more important to it than the PRC is to the United States, and consequently that there is no particular need to deal with it with any special degree of caution. In recent months this thesis has been questioned both in the sphere of actual policy and in the debates that have broken out in the United States, including those between the Reagan entourage and the presidential candidates from the Democratic Party.

Under these conditions, the administration has taken a number of steps to activate its "China policy" and thereby anticipate opponents' accusations that Reagan's approach to American-Chinese relations has been a failure. Weinberger's visit to Beijing and the more active exchange of visits in general are an important part of these measures.

However, the Reagan administration's approach to China has basically been the same throughout the entire period it has been in power. It is distinguished by stubborn, persistent attempts, which frequently go beyond the bounds of diplomatic propriety, to use the "China factor" in the interests of the U.S. global antisocialist and anti-Soviet strategy, without the slightest concern for the interests and real needs of the PRC.

As before, this socialist country is still regarded by Washington as a class and ideological enemy of the United States. Washington's main aim is to impose so-called "strategic cooperation" upon the PRC at all costs--that is, a relationship which would undermine the interests and positions of other socialist states. Washington is prepared to pay for participation in this kind of "cooperation" with technology, military equipment, etc. As soon as it turns out that the interests of PRC foreign policy are inconsistent with this project, reproaches, reproofs and even empty threats of "sanctions" spill out of Washington.

The current administration is striving to utilize American-Chinese relations in its domestic political interests. In this connection, the scheduling of President R. Reagan's trip to the PRC is significant. April 1984 will be the height of the election campaign, when primary elections will be taking place in a number of American states. The creation of a contrast between a President solving major international problems with one of the great powers, and the numerous candidates from the Democratic Party sullied by intraparty squabbles in the American hearland, has certainly been given some thought by those who

are planning the visit. Reagan clearly hopes that a visit to the PRC will help to improve his image, which has been hurt by his pursuit of a belligerent militarist policy that is increasing instability in the world and is fraught with the danger of war.

Since diplomatic relations were officially established between the PRC and the United States, there have been periods of sharp progressive breakthroughs and periods of relatively slow and even stagnant development, bordering on decline. This is not surprising as this is a matter of relations between two major states that are fundamentally different from one another in social, historical, cultural and many other respects.

Relations between two great powers, each of which exerts considerable influence on international affairs, are nearly always of a very complex nature. There are elements in their contacts which affect the interests of many other states. In our day, when international relations are growing ever more multilateral and intensive, the specific importance of these elements is increasing greatly.

During various stages of American-Chinese relations, the two sides have taken different approaches to the connection between bilateral relations and broader aspects of international relations. During the initial stage of the normalization of American-Chinese relations, the tendency to combine the amelioration of these relations with the amelioration of Soviet-American relations was observed on the part of the United States.

Now the situation is totally different. Washington is doing everything possible to subordinate purely bilateral aspects of American-Chinese relations to its global, antisocialist line. Furthermore, it is trying to impose this line on the Chinese side, which, judging by the official statements of PRC leaders, is primarily interested not in "strategic," but in bilateral and mutually advantageous cooperation with the United States, just as with other countries.

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BOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 84 (signed to press 21 Dec 83) pp 115-116

[Review by V. D. Pisarev of book "Teoreticheskiye voprosy sovremennogo mezhdunarodnogo morskogo prava" [Theoretical Aspects of Contemporary International Law of the Sea] by M. I. Lazarev, Moscow, Nauka, 1983, 302 pages]

[Text] In 1982 the third UN conference on the law of the sea concluded with the drafting of a new convention. This event was an important stage in the resolution of the global problem of developing world ocean resources, the increasing significance of which was discussed by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yu. V. Andropov in his speech at the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

Now Soviet science, which played an important role in drafting the "charter of the seas," has new and important tasks to perform in connection with the summarization and interpretation of conference results, the disclosure of problems in the interpretation and implementation of conference provisions and the assessment of prospects for the development of international relations in the exploitation of world ocean resources.

This study by M. I. Lazarev, representing a new step in the creative development of the Soviet doctrine of international maritime law, will contribute much to the accomplishment of these tasks. From a Marxist-Leninist vantage point, the author reveals the substance of this doctrine as a field of international law, which was influenced considerably by the Great October Socialist Revolution (p 154), defines the elements of international regulations governing the world ocean and examines problems in the coordination of global and regional rules regulating maritime activity by sovereign states.

M. I. Lazarev's study will be of great interest to Soviet researchers of American affairs because it contains valid criticism of bourgeois theories and of the U.S. approach to the distribution of rights and the regulation of the activity of states in the world ocean. The author's analysis of the theoretical bases of U.S. imperialist policy in the world ocean is particularly pertinent.

The author's brief excursions into the history of the birth, establishment and development of American expansionist theories indicate the presence of a direct

line leading from the theories of Admiral Mahan, the herald of American imperialism who believed that the U.S. Navy would take the lead in securing global supremacy (p 146), to the well-known declarations of President H. Truman, who initiated the division and partition of the world ocean (pp 222-223), and from them to the current administration, which is openly declaring its right to appropriate the minerals and resources of the world ocean.

The author cogently demonstrates that this essentially integral policy is based on American reliance on military strength (pp 146-147, 157), on economic and politico-military agreements which benefit American monopolies and which they are trying to force on other states (p 223) and on unilateral actions contrary to the universally accepted principles and standards of international relations (the U.S. laws of 1976 and 1980 on the fishing zone and the exploitation of the deep-water resources of the ocean floor--see pp 252, 268).

Reactionary nationalist and globalist theories represent the politico-legal basis of the American imperialist line in the world ocean. M. I. Lazarev reveals the reactionary substance of the ideas of supragovernmental regulation, the taxation of activity by states in the world ocean, etc.

This criticism is important and pertinent because the United States has not given up its attempts to undermine the convention, dismantle the carefully balanced package of agreements, introduce confusion into questions pertaining to the use of the ocean and wreck the bases of mutually beneficial cooperation by states in this vitally important sphere of human endeavor.

The author contrasts U.S. aggressive policy in the world ocean with the constructive approach of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to the regulation of international relations in the peaceful and fair exploitation of world ocean resources based on the principle of the sovereign equality of states.

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BOOK ON NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS REVIEWED

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 84 (signed to press 21 Dec 83) pp 116-117

[Review by A. A. Arzumanov of book "Bezopasnost' v yadernyy vek" [Security in the Nuclear Age] by V. F. Davydov, Kiev, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury Ukrainy, 1982, 186 pages]

[Text] The unrestrained arms race and preparations for nuclear war have been accompanied by unbridled and false imperialist propaganda designed for the malicious misrepresentation of the views of the socialist countries. For this reason, it is particularly important for Soviet scientists to write works exposing these lies and containing in-depth Marxist analyses of the U.S. and Soviet positions on such major issues of the present day as the prevention of nuclear war, the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, the cessation of nuclear tests, and disarmament.

V. F. Davydov's book about nuclear nonproliferation belongs to precisely this category of works. Examining the history of this issue, the author analyzes and compares the Soviet and U.S. positions. Pointing out the fact that the problem of nonproliferation came into being at the same time as the atom bomb, he writes that the Soviet Union immediately proposed a ban on the use of atomic energy for military purposes. Our country continued to adhere to a consistent line in this area, actively seeking effective ways of blocking the spread of nuclear weapons.

In contrast to this clear and precise Soviet position, U.S. policy has been distinguished by duality, vacillation, a preoccupation with transitory factors and the direct promotion of the spread of nuclear military equipment.

At present the world public is justifiably disturbed by the existence of so-called "near-nuclear" or "threshold" states--South Africa, Israel and Pakistan--which are straining to reach nuclear weapons. The author cites evidence to prove that the monopolies and governments of the United States, England and France are ignoring UN appeals and are supplying these countries with the latest nuclear technology, building plants for the production of fissionable material and equipping these countries with modern means of delivering nuclear projectiles. The West's policy stems from a desire to retain its influence, intimidate progressive states and national liberation movements,

particularly on the African continent, and involve the "threshold" states in the West's struggle against the so-called "communist threat" (p 53).

As V. F. Davydov correctly points out, Israel's nuclear ambitions are particularly dangerous, considering the overall explosive situation and its aggressive line in the Middle East. In this case as well, the author stresses, the blame for Israel's possession, judging by the reports of the CIA and the Western media, of an arsenal of atom and hydrogen bombs can be laid wholly on the Western powers, especially France and the United States, which have supplied Israel with nuclear technology, trained Israeli nuclear physicists and acted as silent partners in several of Tel Aviv's criminal actions, including the theft of fissionable materials for the creation of Israeli nuclear potential. Israel's bandit raid on the nuclear reactor in Iraq was made possible only by Washington's total support (p 66). This is why the Soviet Union submitted a proposal to the 37th Session of the UN General Assembly regarding the immediate discussion of "increased effort to eliminate the danger of nuclear war and secure the safe development of nuclear power engineering."

The dual and transitory nature of the position of U.S. ruling circles on non-proliferation was clearly evident in their approach to Pakistan's nuclear ambitions. Broad-scale American military assistance is being literally forced on Pakistan and its nuclear ambitions are no longer open to discussion (p 75).

The USSR's consistent efforts to strengthen the security of non-nuclear countries and to prevent these states from becoming the targets of nuclear blackmail are discussed in detail by V. F. Davydov. In particular, this is the purpose of the Soviet-proposed draft world non-aggression pact, which would reinforce the ban on the use of nuclear and conventional weapons for aggressive purposes, and the draft international convention on stronger security safeguards for non-nuclear states. This is also the purpose of the entire group of Soviet initiatives regarding a total nuclear test ban and the reduction and eventual destruction of nuclear stockpiles, put forth at special sessions of the UN General Assembly on disarmament and the 37th and 38th sessions of the UN General Assembly, which would completely eliminate the danger of the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons. "The nuclear age inexorably dictates its own security standards, and these must be observed if peace, civilization and even life itself are to survive on our planet," the author writes in conclusion (p 183). V. F. Davydov's work will contribute a great deal to the comprehension of these problems.

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NEW LEADER OF CANADIAN CONSERVATIVES

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[Article by S. Yu. Danilov]

[Text] After Canada's second-ranking party, the Progressive Conservative Party, suffered a defeat in the 1980 parliamentary elections, it was marked by a constant struggle to undermine the position of Joseph Clark, the party's leader since 1976. When Clark was unable to gain enough support at a regular party convention in January 1983, he had to call a leadership convention.* On 12 June 1983, attorney Martin Brian Mulroney was elected the new, 19th leader of the Conservatives. He was supported by 1,584 convention delegates (he needed at least 1,455 votes to win).

The new leader of the Conservative Party was born in 1939 in Baie Comeau, a city in northern Quebec. He studied law at St. Francis Xavier University (in Nova Scotia). When Mulroney was a freshman he joined the Conservative Party, going against a family tradition: All of his relatives voted for Liberals. By 1956 Mulroney was a delegate to the convention where Diefenbaker was elected the head of the party. In 1966 he became a member of the party leadership's political committee, but he was most active not on the central level but in Quebec party organs, where he gradually became one of the most influential figures on that level. In the 1970's Mulroney took charge of party contributions.

Nevertheless, for over 20 years Mulroney avoided running for office on the party ticket because the deep-rooted unpopularity of the Conservatives in Quebec gave him almost no chance of winning a parliamentary election. Furthermore, the party leadership needed French-Canadians, and not Anglo-Canadians, as deputies from Quebec. For this reason, Mulroney remained an unpaid party activist and did not confine his range of interests to politics.

After Mulroney graduated from the university, he became an employee and then a partner in the influential Ogilvy, Cope & Porteus law firm, where he specialized in labor relations. Mulroney's performance in this field gave him the reputation of a competent lawyer and an expert negotiator. Prominent entrepreneurs began to enlist his services, including P. Desmarais, the extremely rich French-Canadian businessman.

In the middle of the 1970's Mulroney made his first attempt to enter the forefront of politics. In fall 1975 he was one of the 12 contenders for national leader of the Conservative Party. Mulroney's campaign was severely affected by his political inexperience. He stunned the public with extraordinary statements with a political content ranging from leftist radical opinions to extreme rightwing views. Mulroney's colleagues later admitted that his first campaign was indisputably superficial and was designed to make a big impression. In their words, however, the campaign was successful because its main purpose was to make Mulroney's name known in the country at any cost.

In 1976 Mulroney became the vice president of the Canadian branch of the American Iron Ore Company, and then became its president soon afterward. He was invited to join Iron Ore because the company was experiencing severe difficulties: Relations between labor and management were strained to the breaking point, strikes broke out frequently at company enterprises, and stockholders had not earned any dividends for several years. Mulroney justified the trust of the corporation's owners. He displayed extraordinary flexibility in his capacity as its president: He agreed to limited participation by union activists in the discussion of production matters and to a slight increase in pensions. He regularly toured the enterprises of the company, which were scattered throughout northern Quebec and Newfoundland, and visited mines and the workers' homes and hangouts. In this way, he made himself and his company popular.

Mulroney's work in Iron Ore was an important stage in his career. It increased his influence and his contacts in the business and academic communities. He became a member of the boards of 13 corporations, including one of the country's five leading banks, the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, and was a trustee of two universities--St. Francis Xavier and Concordia (in Montreal). Business trips took him to the United States on a regular basis; there he established close contacts with American businessmen, union activists and state and federal government officials. In those same years he visited the countries of Western Europe, Japan and Romania.

Displaying loyalty to Clark, Mulroney kept a close watch on his political rival's (by this time, Mulroney's ambitions had grown considerably) painstaking attempts to achieve the unity of his party and strengthen its influence in Quebec. Mulroney persisted in expanding his party contacts on the federal level. He organized annual fishing trips to a remote Labrador island which were actually conference of party activists dissatisfied with Clark.

When the Clark government was defeated in the 1980 election after 9 months in power, his opponents became more active. Of all the potential contenders for party leadership, Mulroney was the most consistent and also the most cautious and reserved in his behavior. Continuing to refrain from any public criticism of Clark, he made a series of trips in fall 1981 which were ostensibly made to solicit contributions for the party but actually resembled the campaign tour of a candidate for party leadership. At the Conservative convention in Quebec in March 1982, all of the administrative positions in this organization were assumed by Mulroney's supporters, giving him more support in the party upper echelon than almost any of his rivals. As a result, Clark resigned at

the party convention in the beginning of 1983 and the position of party leader was officially declared vacant.

In 1983, therefore, Mulroney finally began campaigning openly for the office of party leader. This campaign was restrained and circumspect in comparison to his loud and extravagant 1976 campaign. Refusing to advertise himself in the mass media, Mulroney concentrated on influencing the party activists who were to vote at the convention. Although he was not short of funds (his supporters included, according to the Canadian press, prominent businessmen P. Desmarais, C. Black and S. Roman), he nevertheless spent "only" 600,000 dollars, while his chief rivals spent from 750,000 to a million.

The thorough analysis of public opinion was organized, and to this end Mulroney set up his own polling service and signed a contract with a Canadian public opinion research institute. Mulroney tried to turn his lack of parliamentary experience into an asset by constantly stressing his nonpolitical endeavors. Another trump card was his fluency in both of Canada's main languages (polls conducted just before the convention indicated that the majority of Conservatives now, in contrast to the recent past, believe that the party leader should be fluent in French as well as English).

Last June Mulroney's efforts paid off. He won the necessary number of votes at the Conservative Party convention and became the party's leader. In the subsequent elections of 29 August 1983, he was elected to Parliament.

Mulroney's political platform represents a variety of conservatism which is quite popular throughout North America at present. Like President Reagan, the new Conservative leader wants to reduce government spending on social programs. He hopes to revitalize economic activity in the country by giving small and medium-sized businesses more extensive tax benefits and further relaxing restrictions on foreign capital.

Mulroney has refrained, however, from openly publicizing such rightwing economic and political remedies as the broad-scale sale of government enterprises to private capital, the complete cancellation of government price controls and the reduction of corporate taxes.

Questions of industrial strategy, production efficiency and the incorporation of new technology--that is, the very fields in which Canada has lagged behind other capitalist nations in recent years--occupied a more prominent place in Mulroney's platform than in the programs of other candidates for the office of party leader. In particular, Mulroney proposed the creation of a special "labor productivity council" (representing business, the unions and the government) to draw up a national program of action in this area. He has advised businessmen to stimulate labor productivity by making some concessions to labor in matters pertaining to working conditions, the organization of production teams, the retraining of manpower, etc. He is earnestly endorsing the experience accumulated by Japanese monopolies in the "improvement of human relations."

Mulroney--the first politician from Quebec to lead the Conservative Party in the 20th century--takes every opportunity to stress his firm belief in a

united Canada. In contrast to Clark, who sometimes made unofficial agreements with separatist groups in the hope of winning votes in Quebec, Mulroney has dissociated himself from anything resembling support for separatism or Quebecois nationalism. In a brochure entitled "My Position," published just before the party leadership convention, he acknowledged that Quebec was linguistically and culturally unique, but simultaneously opposed all theories regarding "two, five or ten nations" and stated that no one Canadian province should be superior to any other.

Mulroney is the first leader in the history of his party to have had direct contact with American capital prior to taking office. When he worked for Iron Ore, he was associated with the extractive industry, the sector of the Canadian economy in which the positions of U.S. business and pro-American groups are particularly strong. In contrast to Clark, he never joined any public organizations like the Committee for an Independent Canada, promoting the idea of stronger Canadian independence. Even before the party convention, he informed the GLOBE AND MAIL newspaper that he would go to Washington within 30 days after taking office, to restore the "unique relationship that should exist between the leaders of two partner countries." Later, at the convention, he said that the Canadian armed forces should be "better allies of the United States in strategic regions of the world." It is true that Mulroney has not gone as far as many rightwing Conservatives in the sphere of Canadian-American economic relations. For example, he does not support the idea of free trade between Canada and the United States, which was defended at the convention by former Finance Minister J. Crosbie and millionaire P. Pocklington from western Canada.

In matters of foreign policy, the new Conservative leader, who was not engaged in international issues in the past and has close contacts with Canadian and American big business, assigns priority to the aims of rightwing political groups in North America. His feelings about the main aspects of international development coincide with the approach of the Conservative Party majority, which has constantly moved further to the right in the last 5-7 years. Along with the other candidates for the office of party leader, Mulroney advocated increased military spending, a larger Canadian contribution to NATO, solidarity with Reagan's interventionist line in Central America and the testing of cruise missiles on Canadian territory. After the incident involving the invasion of Soviet air space by the South Korean airplane, he called the Canadian Government's sanctions against the USSR (the cessation of Aeroflot flights to Canada for 2 months) too timid and advised the Trudeau government to take a tougher stand.

With the change of leadership, the rightist-centrist policy of the Canadian Conservative Party acquired a pragmatic, determined and resourceful leader.

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CHRONICLE OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS (SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER 1983)

Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 1, Jan 84 (signed to press 21 Dec 83) pp 125-127

[Text] September

1 -- A TASS statement on the U.S. armed intervention in Lebanon was published.

5 -- The Soviet Embassy in the United States sent a note of protest to the State Department in connection with the terrorist attack on the building occupied by the permanent representative of the USSR to the United Nations. The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a vehement protest in connection with the brutal attack to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, noting that the circumstances of the case indicate that the American authorities had advance warning of the provocative act.

6, 8, 13, 15, 20, 22, 27, 29 -- Plenary meetings were held in Geneva at the Soviet-American talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe.

7 -- A Soviet Government statement was published in connection with the incident involving the South Korean airliner. The statement said that a thorough analysis of the circumstances left no doubt that this plane was flying over Soviet territory on a spy mission. Washington made use of the incident to launch an anti-Soviet campaign. American President Ronald Reagan decided to institute "sanctions" against the USSR in connection with the South Korean airliner incident. On his orders, the Aeroflot agencies in Washington and New York were closed on 15 September and all commercial and other contacts by American airlines with Aeroflot were prohibited.

8 -- During the final stage of the Madrid meeting of representatives of the 35 states party to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko met with U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz.

14 -- The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense held a press conference in Moscow for Soviet and foreign journalists on problems of nuclear arms limitation in Europe.

15, 16 -- the Senate and House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress passed an anti-Soviet resolution. Military items in the U.S. budget for fiscal year 1984 were simultaneously approved with no changes.

18 -- In violation of universally recognized international standards, the U.S. authorities did not guarantee the security of the head of the Soviet delegation to the 38th Session of the UN General Assembly and even refused to allow a special Aeroflot plane to deliver the USSR delegation to this session. This made it impossible for USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, to go to New York.

20 -- A TASS statement mentioned the further exacerbation of the situation in Lebanon by the United States' overt use of military force.

22 -- A session of the Soviet-American Standing Consultative Commission, created to aid in the implementation of the aims and provisions of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, of 26 May 1972, and the agreement concluded by both sides on 30 September 1971 to reduce the danger of nuclear war, began in Geneva.

22 -- A group of armed individuals threatened a New York port official and tried to interfere with the loading of the Soviet freighter "General Kravtsov." Within a few hours the car of A. P. Voloshin, Soviet employee of the AMTORG joint-stock society, was detained and searched by FBI agents near the port. The Soviet Embassy in Washington issued a protest to the U.S. State Department in connection with the incident.

29 -- A statement was published by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Yu. V. Andropov, in which the policy line of the current U.S. administration in international affairs is described, in brief, as "a militarist line posing a serious threat to peace. It essentially ignores the interests of other states and peoples in the attempt to secure a dominant position in the world for the United States of America."

October

3 -- The START delegation from the USSR, headed by Ambassador V. P. Karpov, arrived in Geneva.

The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois refused to review its decision of 29 May 1983 that 15-year-old V. Polovchak should be reunited with his parents. This reaffirmed the illegality of the behavior of American authorities who kept the Polovchak family from being reunited for 3 years.

4 -- PRAVDA published an editorial entitled "Washington-Style Flexibility or the Latest Deception" about Washington's latest proposals at the Soviet-American talks on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe.

6, 11, 13, 18, 20, 25, 27 -- Plenary meetings of the Soviet and American START delegations were held.

12, 18, 20, 25, 28 -- Plenary meetings of the Soviet and U.S. delegations at the talks on nuclear arms limitation in Europe were held.

14 -- A group of American scientists--leaders of the Physicians of the World for the Prevention of Nuclear War--held a press conference of great interest to the American public in New York upon their return from the USSR.

17 -- An exhibit of American machines and equipment for the production, processing, transport and storage of agricultural produce opened in Moscow.

17 -- The heads of the Soviet and American START delegations met in Geneva.

19 -- A. A. Gromyko received U.S. Ambassador to the USSR A. Hartman at his request. They discussed some important aspects of Soviet-American relations.

20 -- The fourth meeting of delegations from the USSR Academy of Sciences and the U.S. National Academy of Sciences ended in Moscow. Some of the topics discussed were a number of cardinal issues connected with the need to reduce the danger of nuclear war and curb the arms race.

23 -- A PRAVDA editorial entitled "The Flexibility Is Imaginary but the Deception Is Real" assessed the "new" American START proposals.

26 -- A Soviet Government statement condemned aggressive U.S. behavior posing a threat to the Republic of Nicaragua.

27 -- The replies of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Yu. V. Andropov to PRAVDA's questions about the state of affairs at the Soviet-American talks on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe were published.

A TASS statement was issued in connection with the American aggression against Grenada.

Former U.S. Ambassador to the USSR A. Harriman criticized the Reagan Administration's policy in relations with the USSR.

28 -- The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent the U.S. Embassy a note to protest the shelling of the USSR Embassy in Grenada by American planes.

29 -- Yu. V. Andropov's reply to the appeal of the Third International Congress of Physicians of the World for the Prevention of Nuclear War was published.

November

1, 3, 10, 15, 17, 22, 29 -- Plenary meetings of the Soviet and American START delegations were held in Geneva.

1, 3, 9, 15, 17, 23 -- Plenary meetings of the Soviet and American delegations at the talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe were held in Geneva. At the meeting on 23 November the Soviet delegation announced that the current round of talks would be broken off indefinitely.

5 -- A TASS statement was published on the projected large-scale U.S. military operation in Lebanon.

10 -- The CPSU Central Committee sent greetings to the 23d National Congress of the Communist Party USA.

An interview with Academician V. Burakovskiy of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences on Soviet-American cooperation in medicine was printed in IZVESTIYA.

12 -- The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the U.S. Embassy in Moscow that an inspection conducted by competent Soviet organizations had established the groundlessness of the embassy's complaints about some kind of radioactivity in the embassy building.

15 -- USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, received U.S. Ambassador A. Hartman at his request.

A conference of Soviet and American scientists was held in Washington to discuss "The World After Nuclear War." A telephone bridge between the USSR and United States was established during the course of the conference.

16, 18 -- The message of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium to U.S. President Ronald Reagan on the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the United States and the American President's reply were published.

Representatives of the public met in Moscow to commemorate the 50th anniversary of Soviet-U.S. diplomatic relations.

17 -- Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, received prominent American businessman and public spokesman J. Crystal. M. S. Gorbachev conveyed to him the verbal reply of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Yu. V. Andropov to the appeal of the editor of the DES MOINES REGISTER.

19 -- An article by Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense and member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, entitled "We Must Fight for Peace and Strengthen Our Defensive Capability," was published in PRAVDA.

The National American-Soviet Friendship Council met in Philadelphia to commemorate the 50th anniversary of Soviet-U.S. diplomatic relations.

21-24 -- Members of the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and the Federation of American Scientists met in Tbilisi to discuss ways of preventing nuclear war.

22 -- The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement in connection with the American side's attempts to misrepresent the Soviet position at the talks on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe with the aid of an unofficial offer of compromise by the head of the American delegation, P. Nitze.

25 -- A statement by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Yu. V. Andropov on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe was published. It said, in particular, that "the appearance of American 'Pershings' and cruise missiles on the European continent is becoming a fact."

30 -- Soviet and American women met in Moscow to discuss the contribution women's organizations had made to the struggle for disarmament and to the establishment of trust and mutual understanding.

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